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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the implications for European 
political and economic stability posed by dependence on 
Russian oil and natural gas energy sources.  The first 
section looks into the past actions and strategic culture of 
Russia to determine if there exists a threat that Russia 
will deny energy resources to European countries for 
political or economic gain.  The second section analyzes the 
current calculus of Europe’s dependence by determining 
current and estimated future consumption needs and the 
feasibility of alternative sources of energy.  The third 
section investigates the importance of revenues that Russia 
receives from consumption of oil and natural gas exports to 
Europe on their Gross National Product and economic growth 
for the future.  By understanding Russia’s strategic culture 
and the interdependence of European demand and Russian 
supply, conclusions are made that determine the threat, 
risk, and circumstances that Russia will deny energy 
resources to European countries. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1 
A. PURPOSE ............................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE .........................................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................4 
1. Major Questions and Arguments .................4 
2. Russia’s Strategic Culture ....................6 
3. Russian Energy Power and Issues ...............8 
4. European Dependence ..........................10 
D. METHODOLOGY .......................................12 
E. SOURCES ...........................................15 
II. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE ..............................17 
A. WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE .........................17 
B. RUSSIA’S HISTORICAL CONTEXT .......................20 
C. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CULTURE ........................24 
1. Power in the Presidency ......................25 
2. Concentration of Power .......................30 
D. FOREIGN POLICY CULTURE ............................33 
1. The Messianism of Russian Thought ............36 
2. Opposing the Unipolar Hegemon ................40 
E. SOCIETY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE .....................43 
III. EUROPEAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE .............................53 
A. EUROPEAN DEMAND ...................................53 
B. IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION ...........................55 
C. LONG TERM CONTRACTS ...............................57 
D. EUROPE’S STRATEGY TO REDUCE ENERGY NEEDS ..........60 
IV. RUSSIAN ENERGY .........................................63 
A. INTRODUCTION ......................................63 
B. RUSSIAN OIL AND NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ...............66 
1. Oil and Natural Gas Reserves and Production ..68 
2. Exports to Europe ............................71 
3. Revenues .....................................72 
4. Energy Strategy ..............................74 
V. CONCLUSIONS ............................................77 
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND PAST ACTIONS ................77 
B. EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ...............................79 
C. RUSSIAN ENERGY ASSESSMENT .........................80 
1. Strengths ....................................82 
2. Weaknesses ...................................84 
3. Opportunities ................................85 
4. Threats ......................................85 
D. THE CURRENT CALCULUS ..............................87 
 viii
LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................105 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Opinion Study on Democracy and Europe...........47 
Figure 2. Opinion Poll Questions and Results for the 
International Competitive Power of Russia.......48 
Figure 3. Russians on Recent Measures by Putin’s 
Government......................................49 
Figure 4. Endorsement of Democracy........................49 
Figure 5. Russians on Nationalizing Industries............49 
Figure 6. Support for Democracy or Centralized Government.50 
Figure 7. Oil and Gas Pipelines to Europe.................54 
Figure 8. European Dependence on Russian Natural Gas......56 
Figure 9. Natural Gas Lines and Proposed Nord Stream......59 
Figure 10. Oil Basins and Infrastructure...................67 
Figure 11. Natural Gas Basins and Infrastructure...........67 
Figure 12. Petroleum Proved Reserves.......................68 
Figure 13. Annual Total Oil Production.....................69 
Figure 14. Natural Gas Production..........................70 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to express tremendous thanks and deep gratitude 
to all of my gracious, helpful, and talented professors, 
colleagues, and friends whom I have had the good fortune and 
great pleasure of knowing during my time at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  I would rather not mention all by name 
for fear of inadvertently omitting any one, but I’m sure 
that if they read this, they know who they are.  I 
especially want to sincerely thank and offer warm regards to 
my thesis advisors, Professors Mikhail Tsypkin and Robert 
Looney, who both have exponentially enhanced my interest in 
new and exciting subjects.  Their guidance was critical to 
my development as a student as well in completing this 
thesis.  Of course, any errors, omissions, or conflicting 
issues contained within this thesis are my own and made 
possible only through my own faults. 
My wife, Rebecca, deserves the most thanks of all.  She 
has endured many months of my mental, if not physical, 
absence from our home life as she wonderfully cares for and 
teaches our children.  She never ceases to amaze me as she 
always perseveres through the tough times and somehow finds 
the energy to continue to nurture, love, and care for our 
family.  Our children, Rachael, Michael, Julia, Olivia, and 
Vanessa are always an inspiration for us, as we trust in 












The purpose of this thesis is to explore the 
implications for European political and economic stability 
posed by dependence on Russian oil and natural gas energy 
sources.  There exists an awareness that if Europe is too 
dependent on Russian oil and gas, then Russia could deny 
these resources as leverage for political or economic gain.  
Since the end of World War II in 1945, the United States and 
many Western Europe countries have tied their respective 
grand strategies to an enduring transatlantic relationship, 
formally declared through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.  This transatlantic bargain, enacted through 
the concepts of mutual aid and self-help that voluntarily 
limits national sovereignty to act unilaterally without 
respectful consultation of their allies, is the nominal 
expense paid by each member in order to reap the benefit of 
more efficiently pooled economic and military resources used 
to enhance stability and security in an anarchic world.  In 
the stages of conflict and cooperation that occur prior to 
war or any use of force there exist steps of crisis 
management that can halt escalation of conflict as well as 
contribute to a greater degree of cooperation.   
In addition to the security aims of NATO alliance, the 
European Union and the U.S. share a long tradition of 
working together to improve energy security.  EU-US 
cooperation is pursued through multilateral mechanisms such 
as the International Energy Agency and the G8, as well as 
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through bilateral dialogue.  Since Russia has used the 
denial of energy resources as a strategic weapon against 
other states, understanding the components of 
interdependence of European oil and natural gas demand and 
consumption relative to the Russian oil and natural gas 
supply is key to formulating a strategic energy policy that 
may reduce this threat.  Additionally, Russia’s coercive 
energy policies are further influenced by a strategic 
culture that has been shaped by Russia’s historical 
experiences.  Comprehending Russia’s strategic culture and 
how it is manifested in shaping Russia energy policies as 
part of their economic strategy must be taken into account 
as well.  The overall question that this thesis seeks to 
answer is:  What is the risk to Europe, an important ally to 
the U.S., that Russia may attempt coercive diplomacy by 
using oil and natural gas as a manipulative tool? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This issue is of far reaching importance spanning the 
highest levels of government, institutions, and economic 
organizations and will impact diplomacy and cooperation 
between Russia and European states.  This thesis will 
contribute to understanding the balance of interdependence 
between Russian supply of oil and natural gas and European 
consumption.  By understanding the extent of interdependence 
as well as the strengths and weaknesses that each side 
possesses, U.S. and European policy can be developed that is 
complementary, coherent, relevant, and effective in 
countering Russian energy initiatives that pose a risk to 
economic and political stability.  European countries, along 
with the U.S. fear that when their foreign policies are in 
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conflict with Russian national interests, Russia will deny 
energy resources to these countries as a tool to gain 
leverage in political or economic bargaining.  Such had been 
the case with Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia recently.  
Denying energy resources to large European economies could 
disrupt transportation networks, manufacturing, agriculture, 
and domestic well being, and lead to fractured political and 
economic stability.   
In response to this environment of increased distrust 
and new perception of a Russian threat to security in 
European countries, the European Union requested that NATO 
fully discuss energy security at NATO’s Riga summit in 
November 2006.  Additionally, U.S. governmental 
organizations have published documents that also condemn 
using energy as a political weapon of an authoritarian 
government, and claiming that doing so is a serious security 
risk.1  Moreover, on June 8, 2006, the U.S. Senate 
unanimously approved a bill introduced by Foreign Relations 
Committee chair, Senator Richard J. Lugar and named the 
Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2006.  The bill 
proclaims that U.S. national interests and security relies 
heavily on clean, safe, and secure access to oil and gas 
reserves in other countries.2  Less than a year ago at the 
NATO Riga Summit, Senator Lugar expressed his high concern 
that Russian energy policy was a serious security threat to 
all alliance members.  He strongly urged NATO, in no 
                     
1 Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s Wrong Direction:  What the 
United States Can and Should Do.”  Independent Task Force Report No. 57.  
John Edwards and Jack Kemp, Chair; Stephen Sestanovich, Project 
Director, 2006.  And, Bernard A. Gelb, “Russian Natural Gas:  Regional 
Dependence.” Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2007. 
2 Library of Congress Website, “Energy and Diplomacy Security Act of 
2006.”  http://thomas.loc.gov, last accessed August 7, 2007. 
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uncertain terms, to take action within the context of 
Article 5 and to add energy security to their main aims, 
objectives, and areas of response.  Prior to the meeting and 
as momentum continued to build, NATO Secretary-General Jaap 
de hoop Scheffer offered that “the alliance would be able, 
if requested, to take up additional tasks, such as boosting 
energy security for member states.”3  Moreover, NATO 
Declaration 45, released at the conclusion of the Riga 
Summit included NATO “supporting a coordinated, 
international effort to assess risks to energy 
infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure 
security,” and “directing the Council in Permanent Session 
to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of 
energy security, in order to define those areas where NATO 
may add value to safeguard the security interests of the 
Allies and, upon request, assist national and international 
efforts.”4  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Major Questions and Arguments  
Overall, a comprehensive review of the literature which 
includes key documents such as the European Commission 
Energy Strategy Green Paper and U.S. Energy Security 
Strategy reveals that the perceived threat of European over-
dependence on Russian energy sources is somewhat one-sided 
                     
3 Radio Free Europe Website, “NATO Chief Says Alliance Could Improve 
Energy Security,” http://www.rferl.org /featurearticlepring/2006/11, 
last accessed July 7, 2007. 
4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Website, “Riga Summit 
Declaration 45,” http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006 /p06-150e.htm, last 
accessed February 7, 2007. 
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and inward looking.5  While the cautious and defensive views 
rightly illuminate the weaknesses of over-dependence that 
Europe faces, they seem to neglect, or at least disregard 
any weaknesses of Russia’s position, nor do they seek to 
incorporate Russia’s strategic culture in assessing the risk 
of the threat that Russia will continue to use energy as a 
political manipulation tool.  While overstating a perceived 
threat can be expected within the realm of the international 
environment, the misperception of the strength of an 
adversary’s position — in this case economic strength, not 
military — may lead to policy decisions that may be least 
effective and minimize stability over the issue at hand.6  
Moreover, the following proposition by Robert Jervis serves 
to illustrate the key problem that surrounds this issue and 
can serve to frame the question this thesis will answer:  
“If it is true that perceptions of the other’s intentions 
are a crucial element of policy-making and that such 
perceptions are often incorrect, we need to explore how 
states perceive others and why and where they often go 
wrong.”7 
This thesis then, will not only describe the extent of 
European dependence on Russian oil and gas imports, but also 
analyze Russia’s dependence on Europe as a major consumer 
and illustrate the extent to which Russia relies on European 
                     
5 European Commission, “Green Paper:  Towards a European Strategy for 
the Security of Energy Supply” (29 November 2000), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/en/lpi_en/html, last accessed 
October 2, 2007; and United States National Energy Policy, “Report of 
the National Energy Policy Development Group,” May 2001, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/2001/National-Energy-Policy.pdf, last 
accessed October 2, 2007. 
6 Robert Jervis.  Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1976), 107-113. 
7 Ibid., 113. 
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consumption for energy revenues that have been vitally 
important for Russia’s economic growth which has, since an 
initial 10 percent growth rate in 2000, averaged a 6-7% 
annual increase in Gross Domestic Product through 2006.8  
The analysis of Russia’s strategic culture influence on its 
policies and its posture of dependence on Europe for energy 
revenues should enhance this picture, enable a better 
understanding of Russia’s intentions, and aid the U.S. and 
Europe in formulating energy strategy and policy that is 
more effective based on the risk of the threat to deny 
energy resources for political or economic gain.  The first 
goal of this thesis is to establish whether Russian 
strategic culture is likely to make its energy policy 
coercive.  The second goal is to determine the extent of 
Europe’s dependence on Russia for oil and natural gas.  And 
the third goal is to find out how dependent Russia is on 
European consumption as a source of state revenues.  By 
exploring these three topics, a clearer picture of Russia’s 
intentions and capabilities to exert influence will emerge 
and help us devise a cohesive European energy policy that is 
complementary to a linked U.S. strategy. 
2. Russia’s Strategic Culture 
The former Soviet military has sometimes been 
characterized as exhibiting a ‘cultural’ preference for 
preemptive, offensive uses of force that was deeply rooted 
in Russia’s history of external expansionism, and internal 
autocracy.  How true is this?  And, does this cultural 
characterization carry over to other strategic areas and 
                     
8 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Russia Economy:  Quick View - GDP 
Growth Eases,” December 14, 2006. 
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organizations such as politics, the government, academia, 
business, and the population as a whole?  Proponents of the 
term ‘culture’ strongly argue that “different states have 
different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted 
in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are 
influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, 
cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its 
elites.”9  Colin S. Gray argued in favor of the influence of 
culture as it relates to strategy when he wrote:  “Strategic 
culture matters deeply for modern strategy, because the 
culture of the strategic players, individuals, and 
organizations influences strategic behavior.”10  He further 
explains “that culture comprises persisting socially 
transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, 
and preferred methods of operation that are more or less 
specific to a particular geographically based security 
community that has had a necessarily unique historical 
experience.”11  Finally, he offers some very strict points 
about the nature of culture:  “1)  Strategic behavior cannot 
be beyond culture, 2) Adversity cannot cancel culture, 3) 
Strategic culture is a guide to action, 4) Strategic culture 
expresses comparative advantage, 5) Strategic culture can be 
dysfunctional, and 6) Strategic cultures can be variously 
categorized.”12  From his writings, the answer to the 
questions posed above would be ‘Yes.’  That does not mean 
                     
9 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 
International Security, Vol. 19, No.4 (Spring, 1995): 34. 
10 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context:  The First 
Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 
(1999): 25, 56. 
11 Ibid., 51. 
12 Ibid., 62-68. 
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that strategic culture has no limitations to its explanatory 
or predictive characteristics, rather the point here is that 
strategic culture must influence state behavior and is an 
important intervening variable to consider when assessing 
the risk of Russia to continue to use energy as a diplomatic 
weapon.13   
3. Russian Energy Power and Issues 
Russia currently has the second largest known oil 
reserves and the world’s largest known natural gas reserves 
in the world.14  After several years of post-Soviet decline 
in production of oil and natural gas, the industry has 
rebounded to levels that are higher than at any other time 
in Russia’s history.  As a result of this return to high 
output, Russia’s use of energy as a strategic manipulation 
tool for foreign diplomacy and its efforts to impose state 
control over oil and natural gas pipelines, export 
operations, and some production companies is the source of 
alarm for European countries and the United States.  
Gazprom, Russia’s 51%-owned state-run natural gas monopoly, 
briefly cut off gas to Ukraine and, separately, to Belarus 
in January 2006 because those countries did not agree to 
greatly increased prices as a result of eliminating 
subsidies put in place in the 1990s.  In the first case, 
where Ukraine was the victim in January 2006, claims were 
made that this was more than just ending subsidies, but a 
political move by Russia to punish the pro-western 
                     
13 See Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” 
International Security, Vol. 19, No.4. (Spring, 1995): 52-59.  He 
summarizes limitations of strategic culture theory based on 
unfalsifiable empirical evidence. 
14 Ibid. 
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government.  To be sure this was a coercive move that fits 
‘third wave’ deterrence theorist, Alexander George’s 
definition: 
The general intent of coercive diplomacy is to 
back a demand on an adversary with a threat of 
punishment for noncompliance that will be 
credible and potent enough to persuade him that 
it is in his interest to comply with the demand15 
The second incident with Belarus in December 2006 was 
also linked to economics and renegotiating prices that had 
been made in the mid-1990s when Russia’s negotiating posture 
was weaker due to its widespread domestic economic problems 
and lower energy prices.16.   However, the ramifications of 
the Belarus case are particularly acute due to the fact that 
the pipeline that suffered service interruption also travels 
on to service Germany.  As a result, there is widespread 
uncertainly and mistrust among European Union consumer 
countries of Russian oil and natural gas exports that they 
too will suffer strategic manipulation of their energy needs 
and be at the mercy of Russian foreign policy and 
influence.17  Russia has repeatedly denied any claims that 
they are using strategic manipulation of their energy export 
resources to negotiate foreign policy gains in their favor.  
In fact, they offer business case analysis of other global 
                     
15 Lawrence Freedman.  Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 
110.   
16 Lionel Beehner, “Russia:  Gassing the Neighbors,” Council on 
Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, January 3, 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/12325/russia.html, last accessed October 
2, 2007. 
17 Peter Zeihan,  “The Belarusian Crisis:  An Opportunity for 
Germany,” Stratfor, January 10, 2007, 
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=282774, 
last accessed August 4, 2007. 
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companies that practice similar market economy competition 
strategies.  Russian President Vladimir Putin has also 
clearly stated that Russia does not use oil and gas 
resources to coerce its neighbors.18  However, despite 
official statements that argue pragmatic solutions that 
support Russian national interests, the empirical evidence 
counters these claims.  There exist numerous other examples 
that definitively show that Russia has in fact used economic 
coercion to affect the policy choices of other 
governments.19  Indeed, Russia had engaged in leveraging 
oil, natural gas, and nuclear energy resources to manipulate 
the choices of nine Former Soviet Republics in the 1990s, 
including Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and the Baltic states.20  While the 
outcome had not always been compliance by the target state 
to fold to the demands of Russia, in two thirds of the cases 
compliance or at least accommodation was secured.  While 
there are many variables that come into play in Russia’s 
energy policy, an underlying constant is the effects that 
strategic culture plays as strong and pervasive. 
4. European Dependence  
The majority of European countries are heavily reliant 
upon imported energy.  Geographically, most of Europe has 
only an abundance of coal, most notably Germany and Poland, 
                     
18 Russian News and Information Agency,  “Russia Does Not Use Oil and 
Gas as Political Weapons,” January 2, 2007, 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070201/60044654-print.html, last accessed 
August 15, 2007.  
19 Adam N. Stulberg.  Well-Oiled Diplomacy:  Strategic Manipulation 
and Russia’s Statecraft in Eurasia (Albany, NY:  State University of New 
York Press, 2007), 15. 
20 Ibid. 
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some small oil reserves, with Romania at the top of that 
list, and a limited amount of natural gas mostly produced by 
Norway.21  The larger industrial rich economies of England, 
France, Germany, and Italy must seek cooperative agreements 
with other nations in order to provide for the energy needed 
to maintain industry, manufacturing, and domestic use.  
While overdependence is a concern, estimates show that the 
European countries will continue to demand available and 
reliable supplies of oil and natural gas to support further 
economic growth.  Due to the natural geography and proximity 
of Russia to Europe, a partnership of Europe and Russia is a 
necessity.  In fact, building and maintaining this 
relationship is so important to future energy security that 
the European Union concentrates on this relationship as 
their number one energy security priority and formalized it 
through the 2000 EU-Russian Energy Dialogue.22   
The recent instances in Ukraine and Belarus where 
Russia cut off gas supplies to these countries because of 
price disputes has raised the concern level for leaders of 
these consumer countries.  They know that they are too 
dependent on Russian energy and are seeking ways to reduce 
this dependency.   
Despite an ever growing awareness of dependence on the 
side of Europe, Russia is building a strategic new pipeline 
to Europe that will affect European energy security for 
years to come.  This project, called the Nord Stream, will 
                     
21 Richard Overy.  Why The Allies Won (New York, NY:  W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1995), 228-235. 
22 Vince L. Morelli.  “The European Union’s Energy Security 
Challenges,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
September 11, 2006, 10. 
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cross the Baltic Sea and directly connect Russia to Germany 
as it bypasses the Soviet-era, land based energy transit 
infrastructure that traverses several former Soviet Bloc 
countries, including Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland.23  For 
the United States, greater Russian influence over Europe’s 
oil and gas transportation infrastructure is a negative 
geopolitical development.  Russia has shown increasing 
resistance to security cooperation with the U.S. on vital 
issues involving Iran and North Korea, is resistant to the 
promotion of democracy in its periphery, and has 
demonstrated a growing willingness to use its energy 
resources to influence other, smaller countries for 
political purposes.  Furthermore, the U.S. has a strategic 
interest in minimizing European overdependence on Russian 
energy, which would limit the EU’s ability to side against 
Russia on questions of great importance, such as Iranian 
nuclear proliferation and a missile defense shield.   
D. METHODOLOGY  
The framework for this thesis is centered on the 
theories of Past Actions and Current Calculus in determining 
the credibility of the threat that Russia will use energy as 
a coercive diplomacy tool in the future.  Daryl Press 
outlines these theories as competing against each other to 
explain the actions of states when determining the 
                     
23 Nord Stream Website: “Nord Stream AG, a joint venture company, was 
established in December 2005 with the purpose of carrying out 
feasibility study and building the Nord Stream Pipeline.  Gazprom holds 
a 51% interest in the joint venture, and BASF and E.ON hold 24.5% each.  
It was initially established as North European Gas Pipeline Company, the 
name was changed to Nord Stream in October 2006,” http:www.nord-
stream.com, last accessed October 15, 2007. 
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credibility of a threat.24  Three main ingredients are 
outlined as important to states in assessing the credibility 
of a threat:  Power, interest, and past actions.25  Power is 
defined as the capability to carry out the threat.  Interest 
is whether a state views the issue as an important national 
interest that will produce sufficient will to act.  And past 
actions refers to a previous behavior, or reputation, that 
would lead a defending state to believe that the behavior 
will occur again.  While the adversarial relationship is 
defined as anarchic ‘military’ competition in Press’ book, 
in this thesis it will be applied to economic competition.  
Through the findings of three case studies, his research 
counters conventional wisdom and finds that during crisis 
states do not form policy or act according to past actions 
theory, rather they react according to current calculus 
theory which relies only on balance of power and interest of 
each situation independent of past actions.  He argues that 
past actions lose all importance during crisis because 
variables change that effect the balance of power and 
interest in each crisis situation, therefore, only power and 
interest are important.  While I agree with this argument 
based on the empirical evidence presented, I take the 
approach that combines the two theories so that they are not 
mutually exclusive as Press argues, and suggest that past 
actions and current calculus theory both matter, but for 
different reasons.  My argument is that past actions do 
matter, but it is in determining whether a threat exists.  
And that current calculus, the balance of power and interest 
                     
24 Daryl Press.  Calculating Credibility:  How Leaders Assess 
Military Threats (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2005), 7-9. 
25 Ibid., 9. 
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also matters, but it is in determining what the risk of the 
threat is.  Again, the use of these theories is only the 
framework for this study, it is not intended to add to or 
counter Press’ argument which he specifies to apply only to 
military threats at the pinnacle of crises.   
Russia’s strategic culture and previous coercive 
diplomacy behavior will support the hypothesis that Russia’s 
past actions matter in realizing that a threat exists.  
Explaining the interdependence of Europe oil and gas 
consumption and Russia’s oil and gas supply will offer a 
better understanding of the balance of power and interests 
in order to assess risk.  And together, they will contribute 
to understanding the implications to European and U.S. 
security.  
This thesis consists of three main sections.  First, 
Russian foreign policy actions related to energy must be 
properly analyzed within the context of a strategic culture 
containing authoritarian and coercive influences that stem 
from centuries of harsh experiences.  Russia is often 
characterized by a struggle for national identity, survival 
from harsh invaders, the resultant pursuit of security by 
expansion, and the tensions in a multinational society that 
grew from the tsarist empire.26  Russia has shouldered the 
burden of existing in a perpetual identity crisis--being an 
outsider to Europe and the modern world--while feeling 
insecure on all of its borders and occasionally within its 
borders.  The response from the governments across decades 
has been to exhibit coarse, reactionary policies that 
                     
26 Robert V. Daniels.  Russia:  The Roots of Confrontation  
(Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1985), 360.  
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protect the state and consolidates power, and these 
influences resonate today.  The intent of this section is to 
explain that Russia’s historically evolved strategic culture 
continues to shape Russian energy policy.  Second, the 
extent of European dependence on Russia for oil and natural 
gas will be fully investigated.  A wide variety of data will 
be analyzed that includes oil and natural gas demand, in the 
form of current and estimated future consumption needs; the 
variety of sources that oil and natural gas comes from for 
consumption; the opportunities and limitations of 
diversifying these sources either through increased 
production and feasibility of new sources; and exploring 
alternatives such as nuclear, wind, hydro, solar, and bio-
mass energy sources.  And third, the Russian supply of oil 
and natural gas will be analyzed to discern the competitive 
advantages of Russia’s European market such as state control 
of companies, pipelines, and bilateral agreements; the 
opportunities for expanding other markets and increasing 
production and transportation infrastructure; and the 
weaknesses that Russia’s industry faces such as an aging 
infrastructure, lack of competition and monopolistic 
practices, limits to external financing, high transaction 
costs, GDP dependence on energy revenues, and high domestic 
consumption.  The explanation of Russia’s strategic culture 
influences and the analysis of European/Russian energy 
interdependence will aid future negotiating and policy 
making for Europe and the U.S.   
E. SOURCES 
Russian strategic culture and foreign policy 
information comes from historical and political science 
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books and journals, public speeches and press releases by 
heads of state and ministries, Congressional Research 
Service reports, official strategy documents, public policy 
institute and think tanks such as The Brookings Institute, 
The Heritage Foundation, Council on Foreign Relations, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a variety of 
open-source news reporting such as Radio Free Europe, the 
Economist, the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the 
New York Times, and other sources which are listed in the 
bibliography section.  For the interdependence of European 
energy demand and Russian oil and natural gas industry 
supply sections of this thesis, information was available 
from professional journals, governmental agencies such as 
the European Union and U.S. Energy Information Agency, 
international organizations and agencies such as the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund, and companies such as 
Gazprom, ConocoPhillips, Royal Dutch/Shell, and other 
leading international energy companies. 
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II. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Russian strategic culture, that of an imperial Russia 
evolved from its emergence as a state in the middle of the 
last millennium through most of the existence of the Soviet 
Union until 1991, has been one of the most authoritarian, 
coercive, and militarized cultures in history, arguably 
rivaling, if not exceeding, those of Prussia, Imperial and 
Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan in these regards.  
Beginning sometime in the 1970s and continuing through the 
1980s, dramatically so in the years after the collapse of 
the USSR, situational factors arose which opened the 
possibility of changing this nature, significantly 
demilitarizing Russian strategic culture but also leaving 
open the possibility of a revival or reassertion of 
traditional, highly authoritarian Russian strategic culture.  
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the origins, 
contents, and implications of Russian strategic culture in 
order to comprehend how it is manifested in shaping Russia 
energy policies as part of their economic strategy.  This 
chapter will aid in answering the overall question that this 
thesis seeks to answer is:  What is the risk to Europe, an 
important ally to the U.S., that Russia may attempt coercive 
diplomacy by using oil and natural gas as a manipulative 
tool in foreign policy relations? 
A. WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE  
While a perfectly defined notion of strategic culture 
will invariably be open to dispute, it can be thought of as 
“a body of broadly shared, powerfully influential, and 
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especially enduring attitudes, perceptions, dispositions, 
and reflexes about national security in its broadest sense, 
both internal and external, that shape behavior and 
policy.”27 For all its high degree of authoritarianism and 
militarization, Russian strategic culture is not simply 
confined within its military culture, such as the attitudes 
about how military power should be shaped, maintained, and 
used.  Russia’s strategic culture is highly influenced by 
its political culture, how political power is identified, 
obtained, legitimized, and utilized; by its foreign policy 
culture, how the outside world is considered and engaged; 
and by economic culture — although the latter is, in the 
Russian case, more of a product of the other influences than 
by itself a source of influence.28  But that may be changing 
as Russia has moved forward to a more market based economy 
operating within a more democratic environment, relatively 
speaking.  In other words, Russia’s strategic culture has 
formed and is influenced by the intersection of political, 
foreign policy, military, and economic culture—and these 
influences can flow in both directions.   
A common view of the destiny of Russia’s strategic 
culture is that it has followed a despotic-servitude 
relationship over its history.  While the detailed 
ideological specifics changed over time due to the western 
influences of modernity, the internal mechanics and 
structure of Russia were much more enduring.  A quick glance 
at the empirical evidence would tend to support the logic 
                     
27 Fritz W. Ermarth, “Russian Strategic Culture:  Past, Present, 
and…in Transition?”  in Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (October 16, 2006): 3. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
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that the core of Russia’s strategic culture remained intact 
while external influence only slightly diluted it over time 
in the transition from the Tsarist empires, to the Soviet 
domination, and now to the post-Soviet era.  Russia held on 
to serfdom until the emancipation of 1861, which was longer 
than any other country in Europe.  Stalin’s collective farms 
seem to bear some resemblance to serfdom, although in a 
different but arguably more exploitative form.  The Old 
Regime sent dissidents and political prisoners to the deep 
reaches of Siberia, similarly Stalin used the Gulag in the 
same fashion, and now nationalization of major industry and 
imprisonment of powerful and wealthy opposition leaders has 
reemerged.  Moreover, the primacy of political order of pre-
Soviet Russia was a tempered despotic autocracy with 
revolutions from above, namely those of Ivan the Terrible 
and Peter the Great, which share some similarity of even 
farther reaching revolution from above by Lenin that was 
continued by Stalin, and then smaller in scale with the 
transition of Yeltsin to Putin.29  But such similarities 
cannot be perfectly deemed continuities, and are lacking a 
strong empirical evidence of “transmission taking us from 
Ivan and Peter to Lenin and Stalin” to present a causal 
explanation.30  However, despite the absence of an 
undeniable causal presentation of data and while also 
recalling the six characteristics of strategic culture by 
Colin Gray, that does not mean that the Old Regime did not 
mold its Soviet successor, nor does is mean that the seven 
decades of Soviet domination did not mold the leaders and 
                     
29 Martin Malia.  The Soviet Tragedy:  A History of Socialism in 
Russia, 1917-1991 (New York:  The Free Press, 1994), 52. 
30 Ibid., 52-53. 
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society of today’s post-Soviet union led by Vladimir Putin, 
whom operates within a contrasting multi-party environment 
led by the Union of Russia. 
B. RUSSIA’S HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Charles Tilly argued that European states formed along 
three basic modes in order to prepare for war:  Coercion-
intensive, capital-intensive, and capitalized coercion which 
is somewhere in between.31  To be sure, Russia started as a 
coercion-intensive state, where rulers squeezed the means of 
war from the populations and those they conquered and built 
structures and processes for future extraction of resources.  
This included taxing the peasants of crops and livestock, as 
well as these agrarian populations supplying young men as 
soldiers depending on the needs.  But in order to do this 
certain controls had to be implemented to ensure the state 
had the resources needed to wage successful war, either 
offensive or defensive in nature depending on the 
circumstances.   
The early Muscovy state operated under a patrimonial 
regime within the coercion-intensive mode and formed the 
basis for Russia power over two centuries, from the mid-15th 
century to the middle of the 17th century.32  Here is where 
the seeds of what was to come in the future took root.  In 
order for the Tsars to create ‘Russia’ and to have the 
manpower and resources to defend from invasion of superior 
Western and Mongol forces they had to “put an end to the 
                     
31 Charles Tilly.  Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-
1992  (Cambridge, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 1990), 30. 
32 Richard Pipes.  Russia under the Old Regime (New York, NY:  
Penguin Books, 1995), 85. 
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traditional right of the free population to circulate:  All 
landowners had to be compelled to serve the ruler of 
Moscow.”33  This entailed converting their land into fiefs, 
and then commoners were fixed to their place of work, which 
essentially attached the peasantry to the land and they 
became serfs.  This was done under Ivan the III and laid the 
foundations of Russian absolutism.  To ensure security for 
Russia, Ivan needed a stable society rich in resources and 
the state authority to extract and use them.  This is the 
problem that many states face when increased threats require 
action — a need for an increase in executive power.  He 
sought to increase his executive power, but while doing so 
faced no viable opposing force despite an integrated boyar 
network, and therefore he secured absolutism.  Ivan’s 
statecraft is the model that all future Russian political 
systems are based on:  “Absolutism and militarism under 
cautious and scrupulous control.”34 
Despite modest and situationally constrained attempts 
at reform by Peter the Great and Catherine II, examples of 
the longevity of Russia’s strategic culture from this past 
century that follow Ivan the III’s statecraft model are 
embedded in the systems and the leaders.35  First of all is 
the example of Lenin and War Communism that was controlled 
by the central state system that planned, monitored, and 
controlled the extraction, production, and transportation of 
all natural resources and manufactured goods for the entire 
economy.  An example is that in June 1918 the revolutionary 
                     
33 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, 86. 
34 Hugh Ragsdale.  The Russian Tragedy:  The Burden of History  
(Armonk, NY:  M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1996), 18. 
35 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, 117-126, 129.   
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government of Lenin decreed nationalization of all heavy 
industry, which led to subsequent nationalization decrees 
over the next few months in light industry, wholesale trade, 
retail trade, and even reached “every last artisan or 
commercial enterprise in the country, down to those that had 
only five employees.”36  After Lenin’s death, Stalin 
increased internal coercive behavior that included forced 
collectivization of farms and the state purges of the Great 
Terror, complete with show trials that further entrenched 
state control and strong internally coercive tendencies 
within society that resulted in programs of horrific 
consequence.  The dark side of Sovietism grew from its 
absolutist roots and emerged over time as it tightened its 
grip over the country with each constraint, such as 
abolishing private property, eliminating religion, and 
controlling information through censorship and propaganda. 
As the revolution of the Leninist proletariat turned 
first into the dictatorship of the Party, then into the 
dictatorship of Stalin, and finally to the totalitarian 
system that expanded into a global threatening superpower, 
the internal coercion was naturally carried over to external 
coercion that continued through the Cold War years with the 
military as the instrument of choice.  The transition from 
the October revolution to a totalitarian state was not its 
purpose, rather an unintended consequence due to the need to 
maintain internal control from counterrevolutionary forces.  
Once the internal sources of instability to the central 
state power were under control, outside influences of 
instability — with capitalism at the center — also had to be 
                     
36 Martin Malia.  The Soviet Tragedy, 128. 
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confronted, which led to even further controls on society, 
through reduced speech, increased state propaganda, and the 
maturation of a police state. 
As a false pause in Russian history of coercive 
diplomacy that was outward looking, offensive, and somewhat 
imperialistic, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
1990s ushered in hope for enduring change by reforming into 
a more democratic and open free-market economy.  However, 
due to economic disaster, domestic turmoil, corruption, and 
oligarchic power and wealth grabs coupled with the scarce 
resources of oil and natural gas growing in price and demand 
to fuel economies around the world, Russian President Putin 
has reached back to the relative comfort of a culture that 
is familiar to Russians — a strategic culture that 
recognizes state control, authoritarianism, and coercion.  A 
majority of Russians seem to have a deep nostalgia for the 
Soviet era that while oppressive to western standards, at 
least offered some stability for much of society.  By 
tightening state control over western capitalist influences 
and drawing on nationalist principles, Putin has enjoyed 
over a 70% approval rating from Russians.  By eliciting such 
widespread domestic support, his foreign policy — with 
energy as the manipulative tool — is less constrained by 
domestic pressure and is a source of power and confidence 
for Russia as a whole.  This strategy, while causing a less 
stable security environment for Europe, appears to be 
benefiting Russia as it strives to return to the top rungs 
of international influence and relevancy.  Moreover, since a 
concentration of state power and coercion is the long 
running undercurrent and modus operandi for Russia, U.S. and 
European policy makers must take this into account as a 
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major factor for long term policy planning for the future 
when engaging and responding to Russian policies. 
C. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CULTURE 
Russian political culture has been a major contributor 
to strategic culture, especially to its historical 
militarization and more recently to its economic strategies.  
Political culture is itself very harmonious with Russian 
military values in that it is grounded on the accepted 
principle of “who dominates over whom by virtue of coercive 
power or status imparted by higher authority, such as by God 
to the Tsar, the Tsar to the boyars; or by history to the 
communist leadership and in turn to bureaucrats and 
political leaders.”37  Thus, political conflicts were 
resolved by struggle and intrigue, occasionally by force, 
but not by negotiations, bargaining, voting, or legal 
adjudication.38  Marxism, especially as interpreted and 
applied by Lenin and his colleagues, fit rather naturally 
with Russian political culture, despite its materialism in 
contrast to Russians’ notions about the “value system” of 
their culture.39  This is because Marxism is as much a 
martial doctrine and a summons to conflict, as a political 
and social philosophy.40 
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1. Power in the Presidency 
After the turbulence of the first post-Soviet decade, 
it is clear that elements of traditional Russian political 
culture are strongly reasserting themselves under Vladimir 
Putin. The essence of this reassertion is not just in moves 
toward more authoritarian rule, which have been relatively 
mild by Russian and Soviet standards.  Rather, it is the 
clear tendency of those who wield or strive for political 
power in Russia to regard the features of normal democratic 
life – parties, parliament, a meaningful press, election 
campaigns – not as the enabling conditions of a legitimate 
political structure, but as instruments to be manipulated, 
controlled, or opposed for the benefit of the central 
authority.  This is acknowledged as the case when Boris 
Yeltsin’s time as Russian President was nearing the end and 
he and “the family — the complex of close relatives as well 
as political and economic leaders that had benefited from 
influence in the Kremlin,” undertook a full-out search for a 
new face who might continue political ties and win the 2000 
elections.41   
Putin was named by Yeltsin as prime minister in the 
summer of 1999 as that hope, but opinion polls taken at the 
time showed him with only a 4% preference to be the next 
president and behind four other candidates who were not 
Kremlin loyalists.42  However, several factors launched 
Putin’s popularity which included “his image as a youthful, 
vigorous, sober, and plain talking leader, massive support 
                     
41 Archie Brown, ed.  Contemporary Russian Politics:  A Reader 
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42 Ibid., 221. 
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from state-owned television and other mass media, and the 
tough military stance against the Chechens and Islamic 
separatists with the start of the second Chechen war in the 
North Caucasus that occurred soon after Putin took office.43  
Moreover, his tough stance against the oligarchs, perceived 
as gaining great wealth unfairly under the guise of 
capitalist methods, and an economic recovery that saw an 
annual growth rate as high as 9% were also key 
developments.44  All of these factors were instrumental in 
propelling him to become the top presidential candidate in 
opinion polls, securing 58% by January 2008.45  To 
capitalize on the growing base of popularity that Putin 
enjoyed, Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999 giving Putin 
the additional leverage of being an acting incumbent when 
the elections occurred in March.46  Together, the 
circumstances of the Chechen response as well as the 
strategic political moves by Yeltsin are clear examples of 
utilizing democratic structures to continue controlling the 
power of the central government.   
A most recent example is currently playing out and the 
first move took place on September 12, 2007, when Russian 
President Vladimir Putin dismissed Prime Minister Mikhail 
Fradkov, and effectively dissolved the government.  In a 
statement, Putin claimed the move was necessary to prepare 
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Russia for elections, but also it is reported that the move 
was motivated to coincide with Putin’s own political 
strategy for the future in naming a successor that would 
more than likely win in the Presidential elections of 
2008.47  In the official exchange, Prime Minister Fradkov 
offered his support of leveraging and shaping Putin’s 
strategy by claiming that his resignation was done:   
…in order to see you [President Putin] have as 
free a hand as possible in making decisions, 
including human resource decisions.48 
Putin’s response complemented the intent to prepare the 
political playing field in his favor:   
The country is indeed in the run up to 
parliamentary elections now, which will be 
followed soon after by the presidential election.  
Perhaps you are right and we should all reflect 
now on how to organize the power and management 
structure in such a way as to best adapt it to the 
election campaign period and ensure it can prepare 
the country for the period after the parliamentary 
election and the presidential election in March 
2008.49 
The dissolution of the government was expected to 
result in a new head of government, who will be seen as 
Putin’s choice to succeed him after he steps down next 
spring.  Again, Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov said he asked 
for the dissolution because with elections approaching, 
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Putin needed to have a free hand to make decisions, 
including those concerning appointments.  And under the 
Russian constitution, Putin had two weeks to propose a new 
head of government, which the lower house of parliament, the 
State Duma, then has a week to vote on.  Russian news 
agencies said Fradkov would serve as acting prime minister 
until the vote.   
The parliamentary elections are scheduled for December 
2, 2007, followed some three months later by presidential 
elections.  Two top Russian officials were thought to be 
front runners for Putin’s recommendation to be his successor 
and to be nominated as the next Prime Minister.  The first 
was Sergei Ivanov, a first deputy prime minister and the 
other, also a first deputy prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, 
who is also a top executive at the state controlled natural 
gas monopoly Gazprom.50  However, in a surprise to all 
watching and waiting, Putin named a relatively unknown 
official, Viktor A. Zubkov, the Director of the Federal 
Financial Monitoring Service, as the next prime minister51  
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Consequently, the State Duma overwhelmingly approved Zubkov 
in a vote of 381 in favor and only 47 against.52   
The move to appoint a new prime minister has led to 
speculation on how Putin is shaping the future with a focus 
on retaining political and economic stability that his 
policies have brought and in furthering the concentration of 
state power.  The first premise to support this is that 
based on Putin’s widespread popularity, any candidate he 
supports will likely win the next election, or at least 
transfer and command a large proportion of votes based on 
this popularity by association and endorsement.  But, due to 
the fact that Zubkov is relatively unknown, speculation 
assumes that Putin has avoided naming a real successor since 
Putin would become a ‘lame duck’ for the rest of his 
presidency and that he will wait until closer to the 
elections to back a prospective candidate.53  Further 
speculation proposes that the real message Putin has relayed 
by naming an unknown loyalist is to drive home that Putin 
himself is the only source of authority in the country, and 
will remain so now and through the spring 2008 elections.54  
The second speculation is that even if Putin does support 
Zubkov to become his successor, the fact that Zubkov is a 
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loyalist to Putin makes Zubkov a “caretaker” successor to 
the current regime and an extension of Putin’s rule even 
after his authority formally ends.55  Additionally, it is 
thought that perhaps this move may pave the way for Putin to 
return to the presidency at the next elections in 2012, 
since based on the current constitution he cannot be 
retained for a third consecutive term, or that Putin will be 
appointed as the next Prime Minister and the power he 
enjoyed as President will shift to him in this office.  With 
specific speculation aside as to what exactly Putin’s 
strategy is for the future, the broader actions and words of 
Putin at this time do provide substantive evidence that he 
does embrace the enduring Russian political environment that 
rewards shaping the democratic methods and structures that 
currently exist in order to continue a concentration of 
power in the office of the president and among the cadre of 
loyalists closest to him.   
2. Concentration of Power 
Central to concentrating executive power, the Putin 
regime, over time, has also steadily worked to regain 
control of the broadcast media.  A key target was the media 
empire of Vladimir Gusinsky, which included Russia’s only 
independent television network, NTV, which had been critical 
of Putin.  Gusinsky, one of the so-called oligarchs who rose 
to economic and political prominence under Yeltsin, was 
arrested in June 2000 on corruption charges and was later 
released and allowed to leave the country.56  The arrest was 
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viewed as an act of political repression by the Putin regime 
and would be followed in 2003 in a similarly reasoned arrest 
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.57  This assault on the oligarchic 
capitalist system, which Gusinsky was part of, was not to 
change it, but rather a successful attempt by Putin to 
control it.58  In April 2001, the state-controlled gas 
monopoly Gazprom took over NTV and appointed Kremlin 
loyalists to run it.  A few days later, Gusinsky’s major 
newspaper, Segodnya, was shut down and the editorial staff 
of his respected newsweekly, Itogi, was fired.59  The 
government then forced the prominent oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky to give up ownership of his controlling share of 
the ORT TV network.60  In January 2002, TV-6, the last 
significant independent Moscow TV station, was shut down in 
what was believed to be government pressure.61  The 
government has also moved against the independent radio 
network, Echo Moskvuy and other electronic media.  In July 
2006, news media reported that the Russian government had 
forced Russian radio stations to stop broadcasting programs 
prepared by the U.S. funded Voice of America (VOA) and Radio 
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Liberty (RL).62  Threats to revoke the stations’ 
broadcasting licenses forced all but 4 or 5 of the more than 
30 radio stations that had been doing so to stop 
broadcasting VOA or RL programs.63  Additionally, 
journalists critical of the government have been imprisoned, 
attacked, and in some cases killed, as was the case with the 
highly respected investigative journalist and Chechen war 
critic Anna Politkovskaya, who was murdered in October 
2006.64 
Two other aspects are important to relate to the move 
by Putin to name a successor.  First is that a single party, 
Unified Russia, currently commands a 59% majority of the 
support from the public with the Communist party coming in 
at a distant second at just 18%.65  And second, Putin, who 
commands over 70% of popularity from the public is the 
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leader of that party.  Therefore, while elections and a 
multi-party system operate within the political sphere of 
Russia, circumstances of the structure of popularity of 
Putin and his party almost guarantees that any successor 
that Putin names will win the next presidential election, 
therefore continuing the current control of state power.66  
Thus, while certain foundations of democracy are present in 
Russia, such as elections and multiple competing parties, 
the fact that one party dominated the opinion polls somewhat 
constrains the full progressive forces of democracy and 
harkens back to the familiarity of the one party communist 
system as an important element of Russia’s strategic 
culture. 
D. FOREIGN POLICY CULTURE 
Russian foreign policy culture is a reflection of 
political culture to a significant degree. Russian leaders 
have generally been capable of artful and accommodating 
diplomacy when the situation demanded it, as displayed by 
the Soviet pursuits of various versions of détente by 
Stalin, Krushchev, and Gorbachev.  Yet, there always seems 
to be present an attitude of slight mistrust simmering just 
below consciousness that views foreign actors as either 
“enemies, or subjects, or transient allies, or useful fools 
to be manipulated, the attitude of kto-kovo.”67  In the 
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early Soviet period, the mission was to spread world 
revolution, an ideological interpretation for Soviet 
national power, but also a pretense to supranational values 
of justice and progress.68  Military power has long been 
seen as a means for pursuing messianic goals or as a 
protective base from which to pursue them by other means, 
such as diplomacy, political action (overt or covert), and 
even foreign assistance.   
In rhetoric and action, Russian foreign policy culture 
has often expressed a puzzling combination of contradictory 
attitudes:  Defensiveness bordering on paranoia, on one 
hand, combined with assertiveness bordering on pugnacity, on 
the other.  In the Russian mentality, both an inferiority 
complex and a superiority complex can be simultaneously on 
display.69  The traumatic effects of the break up of the 
USSR and decline of Russia’s role as a great power have 
intensified these complexes, especially among Russia’s 
elites.  And the partial recovery of Russia’s international 
standing under Putin’s more disciplined and, as the result 
of energy revenues, better-funded regime, have produced a 
heightened amplification of these complexes in the 
pronouncements and decisions of leaders as well as the 
adversarial stances on international issues.  Despite these, 
or perhaps because of these conflicting complexes, Russian 
strategic leadership has on the whole been notably risk 
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averse at the level of action and operations.70  Russia has 
not engaged in daring high-risk, high-payoff initiatives 
such as characterized the strategic leadership of Napoleon 
and Hitler.  A more pragmatic approach to issues, and the 
tendency to think three times about the ramifications before 
acting was certainly the case throughout the Soviet period 
as well, pushing the limits only on a smaller scale where 
the risks were perceived as moderate.71  The rudimentary 
problems in foreign affairs for the Soviet leaders after 
Stalin’s death were three-fold:  To strengthen the security 
of its borders and internal security, to strengthen the 
security of Russia’s various contiguous satellite state, and 
to extend Soviet influence throughout the world without 
directly involving the its own soldiers in combat.72 
Khrushchev’s deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba in 
1962 may be seen as a dramatic exception.  At the same time, 
the record shows that because the United States was 
accelerating its strategic build up and had recently 
discovered how the Soviets actually lagged, Khrushchev had 
good reason to believe bold action was less risky than doing 
nothing and he saw U.S. actions leading up to his move as 
indications he would get away with it.73  It was as much a 
miscalculation as a daring initiative that failed, despite 
accusations of adventurism Khrushchev subsequently faced.  
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The invasion of Afghanistan was clearly such a 
miscalculation by a very risk-averse Brezhnev leadership as 
well.  More recently, President Putin’s speech at the Munich 
Conference on international security has become a sort of 
pivotal point as he openly and harshly criticized the U.S. 
on a number of key current issues.  The comments are telling 
of Putin’s change from a more cooperative approach to the  
U.S. and the West in general, especially magnified after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, to that of taking the lead 
among a group of countries such as China, Venezuela, and 
Iran that oppose the U.S. as a powerful hegemon in a 
unipolar international arena.  What Putin has demonstrated 
is his readiness for Russia to lead other countries to a 
multi-polar world and work on raising the status of Russia, 
which has been neglected since 1991. 
1. The Messianism of Russian Thought 
Consistent with an enduring culture possessed by Russia 
is an important and complex, though partly constructed, 
messianic theme in Russia interwoven within society and 
regime leaders over time.74  Messianism in the Russian 
sense, where the leaders of Great Russia hold the answers to 
the problems and inequalities of the world, can be seen as 
exhibited with some peculiar differences throughout Russia’s 
history and is especially evident in the years of the 
Bolshevik revolution and subsequent Soviet rule where the 
Kremlin sought to justify and legitimize its rule.  Russian 
political and foreign policy cultures have always had some 
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element of messianism, that is, a sense of national and 
international mission beyond security and prosperity for the 
country.  In the Imperial period, this messianism, the idea 
of Moscow as the Third Rome, the heir of a legendary 
religious and imperial tradition helped to legitimize 
national expansion and also increase the sense of national 
and cultural superiority.75  But, outsiders viewed the 
powerful Soviets and Communist party as seeking to expand 
its power and ultimately to achieve universal domination.  
Moreover, while Moscow appeared to fear the world which it 
wished to reconstruct to fit the communist ideals, it also 
feared the unrest and counterrevolutionary peoples which it 
already ruled.76  With the concept that only Russia holds 
the answers for the future, Moscow sought the support of the 
proletariat in its struggle to subvert and destroy the 
ruling classes of the non-soviet world.  It held out to all 
the countries of the world the vision and prophecy of the 
“earthly paradise, the harmonious society without coercion 
and inequality.”77  This is the utopian aspect of Soviet 
Russia’s message to the world that was rooted in the 
Bolshevik revolution and is now sometimes seen as becoming a 
mythic source of national pride.   
Thus, the Kremlin’s outreaching and intrusive 
activities, its expansionist policies, and its supporting 
ideological system rested upon at least the formal 
foundation of Marxist-Leninist universalism.  It is widely 
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believed that while not fully developed in detail, the 
Kremlin of the Soviet Union had the idea of a plan not only 
for ruling the world, but for transforming it in its own 
image.  To implement this dominating and unique program, it 
had to develop and refine “the doctrine of uniqueness, 
superiority, and universal applicability of the Soviet way 
of life.”78  But it is here at the implementation stage 
where realizing these ideals suffered from fundamental 
contradictions.  Formal Soviet ideology proclaimed 
insistently that the world can enjoy peace, as well as 
welfare and equality, but only if socialism was adopted 
everywhere.79  Therefore, in order for this to occur, it had 
to be forced on some people or societies until there was 
stability.  Moreover, only the leadership of the Soviet 
Union had the formula to achieve the socialism which will 
bring the wanted peace, welfare, and equality.  So, the sum 
of the revolutionary spirit of Russia is that the Russian 
leaders know best how to bring peace to the world and if the 
world does not want to listen, then they had to make them 
listen, but only for their better good.80  This is a prime 
example of just one of the fundamental differences between 
Russia and a society that is more democratized and used to 
coming to majority decisions through debate.81  Leaders of 
all societies have to present a way ahead for their country 
and outline goals and programs which they feel will be best 
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for the future.82  The problem arises when a program such as 
communism has been proposed by a minority group, is 
implemented without regard to opposing views, disregards the 
rights of those that it affects, is absent of full debate of 
the benefits, and does not have an option of flexibility to 
correct for necessary changes.  A counter-revolution, civil 
war, and widespread unrest were the result in Russia’s case 
after the Bolshevik revolution that could only be stabilized 
over the long term through harsh reactionary measures that 
resulted in the totalitarian state programs.  As a result 
the attitude and deep belief system that Russian leaders, 
the Soviet leaders, the Communist party, and central 
planning committee knew what was best for the country and 
the world only grew stronger and was passed on through the 
generations of Soviet rule through the network of state and 
party apparatus influenced ministries and other 
organizations like the KGB.   
In a recent example, Russian president Vladimir Putin 
relayed a candid message that further supports such an 
attitude of centrism.  It concerned Great Britain’s demand 
that Russia extradite its citizen accused of murder on the 
British soil.  Putin has refused on more than one occasion 
citing the Russian constitution’s ban on extradition of its 
citizens.  He said that “they should better change their 
brains than our constitution” and that “they in London have 
30 persons hiding who are wanted by our law enforcement 
bodies for committing grave and especially serious crimes … 
but London doesn’t give a damn and gives refuge to people 
accused of committing especially serious crimes … and 
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meanwhile they apply tougher standards to the others, 
including us.  This includes handing out recommendations, 
which I think are insulting to our nation, to amend the 
constitution.”83  While Putin’s response is defensive in 
this context, it clearly portrays a confident Russian 
attitude that the demands of Britain are ridiculous to them, 
especially since the superior Russian constitution will 
guide not only Putin’s decision, but will be the guide for 
this international situation in general.   
2. Opposing the Unipolar Hegemon 
Sixty years ago, an author known then only as “X” 
published an examination of the sources of Soviet conduct.84  
Now it is well known that it was written by George Kennan, 
the former ambassador to Russia who “saw and felt the 
interconnected problem of Europe, Russia, and America like 
no one else, nor from the same set of angle, or with the 
same intensity.”85  Before being published, its original 
form was a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the 
State Department, and its intent was to ensure that the 
political personality of the Soviets was understood so as to 
form a basis of successful U.S. policy of containment toward 
the Soviet Union for the future, which it did.  Although the 
era of Soviet Union ended in 1991, Europe and especially the 
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U.S. are again trying to understand the motivating factors 
that lead Russia to take confrontational stances on a 
variety of issues.  It can be argue that Kennan’s proposed 
policy of ‘containment’ may be relevant today, in the realm 
of political and economical influence, under Vladimir 
Putin’s strategy of resurgence and movement to restore the 
status of Russia to greatness.86 
There have been numerous issues where Russia has 
opposed western or more specifically U.S. policies and 
decisions that suggest a strategy to propel Russia’s 
international status by drawing on the idea that opposition 
to the U.S. is a demonstration of Russia’s strength.  The 
beginning of Yeltsin’s presidency was viewed with great 
optimism that relations with the West would develop well due 
to economic reform and the introduction of democracy in the 
political process.  But, the second half of Yeltsin’s rule 
saw some disenchantment as controversy over key issues grew, 
such as “the two Chechen campaigns, eastward expansion of 
NATO, the status of Kosovo, the war in Yugoslavia, the 
future nuclear balance between Russia and the U.S., and U.S. 
plans to build a missile defense system.”87  These souring 
issues reduced some of the progress that was being made in 
building a more interconnected relationship.  In the early 
period after Putin came to power, much of the same cycle 
occurred where, due in part to circumstances of the 
terrorists attacks in Russia and the U.S., Putin sought to 
reestablish some common ground with the U.S. to improve 
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relations.  Putin also saw Russia’s economic revitalization 
proceeding only from its integration into the global 
economic system dominated by the advanced industrial 
democracies, which was something that could not be 
accomplished in an atmosphere of political or military 
confrontation or antagonism.  Three main areas can be viewed 
as the catalysts in his desires to restart the relationship 
building process:  “Russia’s economic stabilization, 
energetic communication with Europe, and especially the 
immediate announcement of almost unlimited support for the 
U.S. in fighting terrorism after 9/11.88  However, despite 
Russia’s attempt to increase ties, reciprocity that would 
lead to changes was absent.   
Due to the lack of reciprocity on the western side, the 
resulting Russian perception of an ungrateful and unfriendly 
West, and the stronger position of Russia fueled by economic 
and social progress brought on by increased energy revenue, 
Putin could confront when necessary rather than cooperate on 
some issues where the western policies were deemed in 
conflict with the national interests of Russia.89  The areas 
of disagreement under Putin are relatively similar to those 
of Yeltsin, where the issue of Kosovo, NATO’s eastern 
expansion, conventional forces in Europe, and a variety of 
other policies toward Russia’s neighbors keep political 
progress at a slow pace.90  A substantial statement 
supporting Russia’s assertiveness in becoming a higher power 
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came from Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, who 
wrote that “U.S. unilateralism had failed and that Russia 
was competing with it in an international market of ideas.  
As globalization has extended beyond the west, competition 
has become truly global.  Competing states must now take 
into account differing values and development patterns.  The 
challenge is to establish fairness in this complex 
competitive environment.”91  For Russia, confrontation on 
these issues seems to offer the same rewards that would have 
been true in the Soviet era:  An increase in domestic 
support of the state’s central authority against policies 
towards the U.S., where Putin and his party more directly 
reap this reward through support in opinion polls and 
elections; increased Regional influence, especially among 
some Former Soviet Republics; and increased power at the 
international level among other countries that also oppose 
U.S. policies such as Iran, China, and Venezuela.   
E. SOCIETY AND STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Under Putin the political and foreign policy elements 
of strategic culture -- combativeness and competitiveness, 
perceptions of foreign threat (especially from the U.S.), 
and political assertiveness have been increasingly prominent 
in Russia’s foreign relations and mirrored by societal 
opinion as well, so much so that “Russia’s return” as a 
demanding and leading power in the world was a dominant 
theme of commentary among pundits and politicians prior to 
the July 2006 summit of the G8, chaired by Putin in Russia.  
The ideology on which this reassertion is riding is 
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essentially nationalism, replacing at least to a modest 
degree the role of communist ideology in Soviet times.92 
This nationalism, centered on Russia’s interests, security, 
and influence as an international actor, is accompanied by 
assertions of a supra-national Russian mission, to advance a 
multi-polar world that contains U.S. power, to establish a 
Eurasian geo-political identity distinct from the West, and 
to combat perceived threats from Western culture.  This new 
assertiveness is definitely fueled by the dramatic economic 
recovery of recent years that oil and gas revenues have 
stimulated.   
The Putin regime declares its intent to use Russia’s 
energy resources, and the tight supply situation prevailing 
in the global energy market, to make Russia a great energy 
power, even an energy superpower.  A complete strategy for 
doing this has yet to be publicly articulated.  But it 
clearly involves first, state domination of extraction; 
second, state monopoly of transport through pipelines; and 
third, efforts to push Russian business, increasingly 
dominated by the state, downstream into the processing, 
distribution, and marketing environments of consumer 
markets.  Alarming to many is a clear readiness on the part 
of the Kremlin to use its energy clout on behalf of 
political-strategic interests such as the cases of Belarus 
and Ukraine.  This was perceived not merely as a commercial 
dispute, but an effort to punish Ukraine for the pro-Western 
turn of its internal politics. 
The combined effects of Putin’s internal strategies 
that are more authoritarian and less democratic by western 
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standards — control over the energy industry, quieting 
oligarchic political opposition, and controlling the media 
in conjunction with his external strategies of confronting 
the policies of the west and the U.S. — have definitely 
impacted society as evidenced by results of opinion polls 
taken concerning these issues.  The opinion poll results in 
Figure 1 show a society that clearly supports Putin and has 
a sense that Russia is an independent international leader, 
yet supports the fact that the country lacks a matured 
identification with democracy and does not yet rely on the 
rule of law as a guiding principle of justice.93   
While Putin normally enjoys an overall approval rating 
that consistently tops 70%, in an April 2006 survey of 
Russians, 26 percent of respondents had a ‘very favorable’ 
opinion of President Putin and 59% had a ‘somewhat 
favorable’ view of him for a combined 85% who are more 
likely to support his policies.94  While only an extremely 
small amount, 7%, viewed him ‘somewhat unfavorably,’ and 2% 
‘very unfavorably.’95  The striking aspect of this survey is 
the extremely small amount — only 2% — who view him 
unfavorably.96  
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Concerning the nationalization of the energy industry, 
again public support for the programs is widely supported in 
surveys where 85% support it, with a large majority 56% 
responding ‘definitely.’97  This is compared to only 7% 
opposed.  And more surprising is that 65% of Russians would 
also support nationalizing other industries.98  Moreover, a 
majority of Russians think their country will play a larger 
role on the world stage in the near future and sixty percent 
say Russia will become more influential over the next decade 
as indicated in Figure 2.99  Thus, Putin’s campaign to 
return Russia to a great country status is supported by the 
population not only through favoring him as a leader and the 
techniques mentioned above, but also Russians favor moving 
to a market economy and a strong, socially oriented state, 
as Figure 2 revealed in addition to Figures 3-6100: 
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 Most Russians (71%) do not regard themselves as Europeans  
- Almost half think that the EU is a potential threat to Russia and its financial and industrial 
independence 
- A third see Europe as a neighbour and partner with whom a long-term relationship should be 
developed and enhanced — and half that number think that Europe sees Russia in the same 
way. 
- Nearly half believe that there are many useful things to be taken from Western democracy 
and culture  
- Nearly one third think that Western-style democracy does not suit Russia 
Democracy and Responsibility  
- 65% of Russians find it hard to describe what democracy means  
- 27% say that Russia has never been a democracy  
- One in three prefer the Soviet system of government 
- Just over a quarter of respondents consider democracy to be a fair governance system 
- A third say that Russia currently is a democratic state, a quarter like its current system 
- 94% feel that they have little or no influence over what happens in Russia  
Rule of Law & Human Rights 
- A third of Russians are worried about serious human rights abuses 
- Only 8% believe the judicial system to be completely independent from governmental 
control or corruption (31% gave no response) 
- A majority does not feel protected by the law (68%) 
- Nearly two thirds think that the authorities and state officials are above the law (60%) 
- Only 4% believe that private property is secure 
- Over a half (56%) believe that the judiciary should be wholly or partly controlled by the 
executive arm of the Government  
Figure 1.   Opinion Study on Democracy and Europe  
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President Putin in the beginning of his second presidential term has stated the task to 
turn Russia into the competitive country on a world scene during the nearest 5-10 years. 
How realistic do you think it is?  
 Апрель 2004 г.  Апрель 2007 г. 
Absolutely realistic  8  9  
Somewhat realistic  41  44  
Somewhat unrealistic  32  28  
Absolutely unrealistic  10  9  
President Putin in the beginning of his second presidential term has stated the task turn 
Russia into the competitive country on a world scene during the nearest 5-10 years. How 
realistic do you think it is?  
Approving/disapproving Putin's activity  
 Total 
respondents  Approving  Disapproving 
Difficult to 
evaluate  
Absolutely realistic  9  10  2  4  
Somewhat realistic  44  48  23  32  
Somewhat unrealistic  28  25  43  35  
Absolutely unrealistic  9  5  26  16  
Do you think Russia has become the competitive country during last 2-3 years?  
Approving/disapproving Putin's activity  
 Total 
respondents  Approving  Disapproving 
Difficult to 
evaluate  
Most likely it has  41  47  18  20  
Most likely it has not  49  43  78  63  
Difficult to answer  10  10  4  17  
What is necessary for Russia to become competitive power on a world scene? (Up to two 
responses)  
 April 2004.  April 2007.  
To have developed modern economy  60  61  
To provide a high standard of living of citizens  47  49  
To have powerful armed forces  23  23  
To return to its leading positions in science and education  17  16  
To revive a high level of culture, national spirit  9  9  
To become the leader within the postSoviet countries  4  8  
To provide development of democracy and the human rights 
which are adopted in the civilized world  
8  8  
To become "bridge" between the Europe and Asia, between the 
developed countries and ‘the third world'  
3  3  
Difficult to answer  7  4  
Figure 2.   Opinion Poll Questions and Results for the 
International Competitive Power of Russia 
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Figure 3.   Russians on Recent Measures by Putin’s Government 
 
Figure 4.   Endorsement of Democracy 
 
Figure 5.   Russians on Nationalizing Industries 
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Figure 6.   Support for Democracy or Centralized Government 
Other poll results further support that the 
confrontational approach by Putin, in conjunction with 
nationalist appeal, is shaping public opinion about the U.S. 
in general, although the effects of the unpopularity of the 
war in Iraq may skew the data.  When asked in May 2007 to 
name five countries that could be considered friends or 
allies of Russia, the U.S. only received 6% of the votes 
from Russian respondents, a drop from 11% in 2005 and far 
behind the top five countries of Kazakhstan (39%), Belarus 
(38%), Germany (24%), China (19%), and Armenia (15%).101  
Next, when asked to name which five countries are the most 
hostile and most unfriendly in relation to Russia the U.S. 
received 35% of the votes, up from 23% in 2005.102  That was 
enough for the U.S. to be ranked in the top five, coming in 
at fourth behind Estonia (60%), Georgia (46%), Latvia (36%), 
and just ahead of number five Lithuania (32%).  While 
telling as the polls are about the views of Russians 
generally, it remains difficult to draw any concrete 
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conclusions from these surveys as far as trying to determine 
what came first — did the public support for nationalist and 
confrontational policies motivate the Kremlin to adopt them, 
or did Putin’s widespread popularity influence public 
support for the policies?  A likely answer probably includes 
the constant interaction of both the views and attitudes of 
the Russian people and the influence of the Kremlin that 
worked together to influence and shape the outcomes.103  
From a western point of view, it can also be assumed that a 
majority of people would not agree with these less 
democratic policies as they are counter to necessary 
structures that permit the west to enjoy our fundamental 
freedoms of a capitalist democracy.  However, from the 
Russian point of view, their shared strategic culture formed 
at the intersection of their own political, economical, 
military, and societal structures and experiences offers a 
valuable insight to the effects of strategic culture that 
transcends time, regimes, and circumstances. 
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III. EUROPEAN ENERGY DEPENDENCE 
A. EUROPEAN DEMAND 
Most European countries are heavily reliant upon 
imported energy.  Geographically, most of Europe has only an 
abundance of coal, most notably Germany and Poland.  There 
are some small oil reserves, with Romania at the top of that 
list, and a limited amount of natural gas mostly produced by 
Norway.104  The larger industrial rich economies of England, 
France, Germany, and Italy must seek cooperative agreements 
with other nations in order to provide for the energy needed 
to maintain industry, manufacturing, and domestic use.  
Norway has been able to provide natural gas on a larger 
scale due to offshore gas reserves, but any resources of 
other countries are small in comparison and make up only a 
fraction of oil and natural gas production for Europe as a 
whole.  The European countries continue to demand available 
and reliable supplies of oil and natural gas to support 
further economic growth.  Due to the natural geography and 
proximity of Russia to Europe, a partnership of Europe and 
Russia is a necessity and Figure 7 clearly illustrates the 
extensive pipeline infrastructure that reaches much of 
Europe.105  
                     
104 Richard Overy.  Why The Allies Won  (New York, NY:  W.W. Norton & 
company, 1995), 228-235. 
105 Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Russia:  Country 
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Figure 7.   Oil and Gas Pipelines to Europe 
 
In fact, building and maintaining this relationship is 
so important to future energy security that the European 
Union concentrates on this relationship as their number one 
energy security priority and formalized it through the 2000 
EU-Russian Energy Dialogue.106 
                     
106 Vince L. Morelli, “The European Union’s Energy Security 
Challenges,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
September 11, 2006, 10. 
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B. IMPORTS AND CONSUMPTION 
Looking at just the 25 EU member states, these 
countries consumed approximately 17% of the world’s total 
energy consumption in 2005.  Of that amount, 80% was 
provided by fossil fuels, with the two largest portions 
being oil, 40%, and natural gas, 24%.107  Europe relies on 
Russia for about 30% of its oil imports and about half of 
all imported gas.108  For oil, consumption is estimated to 
remain at a steady level of demand as steps are taken to 
reduce the use of oil, improve efficiency, and convert some 
oil needs over to natural gas, which has become the more 
preferred, cleaner, and cheaper fuel.  However, natural gas 
consumption is expected to increase in the future, and if 
natural gas needs increase, then imports will have to 
increase as well.   
Of the gas that is extracted within European countries, 
most comes from British, Dutch, Italian, Romanian, German, 
and Danish fields.  The remaining needs are fulfilled by 
Russia, Norway, and Algeria.109  Russian gas imports account 
for 26 percent of EU consumption, representing 40 percent of 
the imported gas consumed by households and businesses.110  
By country, the story takes an even more interesting shape 
                     
107 Vince L. Morelli, “The European Union’s Energy Security 
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shown in Figure 8.111  Finland and Slovakia domestic 
consumption relied exclusively on Russian gas imports in 
2005.  Bulgaria, Greece, and the Czech Republic are in the 
second tier with 89%, 96%, and 84% respectively.  And other 
notable countries that rely heavily on Russian import 
natural gas are Hungary, 62%; Turkey, 65%; Austria, 70%; 
Poland, 47%; and Germany 43%.  Lower on the dependency scale 
are the countries of Italy, 30%, France, 26%, Romania, 23%, 
and Switzerland, 12%.112   
 
Figure 8.   European Dependence on Russian Natural Gas 
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The instances in Ukraine and Belarus where Russia cut 
off gas supplies to these countries because of price 
disputes have raised the concern level for leaders of many 
of these consumer countries.  The leaders know that they are 
too dependent on Russian energy and are seeking ways to 
reduce this dependency.  The next two sections will first 
explore long-term contracts with Russia as a way to build 
confidence, create lasting positive relationships, and 
ensure reliable energy sources in the future; and second, 
will examine alternate energy resource strategies that aim 
in reducing oil and natural gas consumption in general. 
C. LONG TERM CONTRACTS 
There are several examples of European countries 
individually negotiating long-term energy contracts with 
Russia.  Germany and Italy are the two largest importers of 
Russian gas by volume, and both have negotiated long-term 
deals with Russia to ensure access to future gas supplies 
and improve their sense of security when it comes to meeting 
energy needs.113  While negotiating a contract is a 
relatively safe way to conduct business from the perspective 
of self-interest, it may not be the best method after 
considering who you are dealing with and the methods that 
Russia has used in the past.  Russia has played hard ball 
with Ukraine and Belarus, cutting off their supplies in 
price disputes which should serve as an obvious warning to 
any consumer country.  The Russian strategy of entering into 
a deal with a single country is simple:  Divide and conquer.  
If each European country were to sign an independent deal 
                     
113 Vince L. Morelli.  “The European Union’s Energy Security 
Challenges,” 12. 
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with Russia, then each country could face similar coercive 
energy tactics in the future.  The seemingly obvious 
solution is for the European countries to determine a 
unified energy position and negotiate with Russia as a 
community.  In fact, recently the EU has developed the 
Energy Charter, but the Russian Duma has refused to ratify 
it mostly because it calls for greater competition in the 
monopolistic Russian industry.114  Energy security is a 
problematic and perplexing issue for the EU and evidence of 
this is that the 25 EU member states are still unclear on 
how best to proceed.  If they were to understand how, as a 
whole, that Russia is dependent on them for a major part of 
their state revenue, then using that weakness to leverage 
long-term contracts that apply to the entire EU would indeed 
be beneficial in attempting to strike a bargain that could 
satisfy both the consumer and supplier.  Because Russia will 
not sign the European Energy Charter agreement, the 
conclusion should be clear that at least Russia understands 
what is at stake for them--a loss of power, control, and 
leverage over the European market. 
Another example is the Baltic Sea pipeline, labeled as 
the North Transgas in Figure 9, but renamed as the ‘Nord 
Stream.’115  This pipeline is planned to deliver Russian 
natural gas directly to Germany and since transit fees are 
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not required since it does not pass through any other 
countries, the gas will be less expensive.116 
 
Figure 9.   Natural Gas Lines and Proposed Nord Stream 
While it is intended to also go on to service the 
Netherlands, France, and later the U.K., the greatest 
benefit is to Russia.  With building the Nord Stream, Russia 
will further diversify their distribution network for 
themselves, reduce cost, and increase dependency of another 
consumer.  The key aspect is building a diversified network, 
which is especially important when you consider the Belarus 
                     
116 Ariel Cohen.  “The North European Gas Pipeline Threatens Europe’s 
Energy Security,” 1. 
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case.  When Russia cut the gas to Belarus, the pipeline also 
went on to service Germany.  Germany considered the 
interruption as unacceptable, and spoke out along with the 
EU to urge Belarus and Russia to quickly end the dispute.117  
If this same scenario were to play out after the Baltic 
pipeline was completed and no common European energy 
position existed, then it would not quite matter as much to 
Germany or any other country that Belarus lost their source 
of gas.  Moreover, Germany or other countries may not be as 
motivated to respond and call for a quick settlement between 
Belarus and Russia.  Long-term contracts are an important 
part of energy dependence for Russia.  Russia serves to gain 
leverage from individual contracts with states, but will 
relinquish some negotiating power if contracting with the EU 
as a whole.  Therefore, a conclusion should be drawn that 
while Russia is not overly dependent on any single country, 
they are dependent on Europe as a whole. 
D. EUROPE’S STRATEGY TO REDUCE ENERGY NEEDS 
Europe’s dependence on imported energy, particularly 
natural gas, is expected to grow at least over the next 
twenty years and the only way to satisfy the demand is 
through imports.  Current estimates predict that 70% of 
Europe’s energy requirements by 2030 will be imported.118  
As a result, the EU Directorate-General for Energy and 
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Transport has outlined three common energy policy goals.119  
The first common goal is competitiveness.  The goal deals 
with creating internal market competition through 
interconnections of energy supply, the electricity grid, and 
research and innovation.  Increased competition would result 
in lower cost and provide the incentive to seek alternate 
sources of energy.  The second goal is centered on the 
environment and seeks to encourage energy efficiency and 
increase the use of nuclear power and renewable energy 
sources such as hydro, wind, solar, and bio-mass.  The third 
goal is to secure and diversify energy sources. 
Currently, there are approximately 175 nuclear reactors 
in operation across Europe, which provide nuclear power for 
about one-third of Europe’s overall electrical 
generation.120  While some countries such as France, 
Finland, Sweden, and the U.K. rely heavily on nuclear power 
and see it as a clean energy source, other countries such as 
Germany and Spain have plans to phase out nuclear power and 
replace it with natural gas due to the dangers it poses 
along with waste disposal problems.121  Overall though, the 
addition of nuclear reactors is not considered a viable 
substitute to burning fossil fuels for energy across Europe 
due to the high up front costs to build nuclear reactors, 
the controversial nature of waste disposal, and perceived 
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risks of nuclear accidents or contamination.  Hydro, wind, 
solar, and bio-mass energy currently accounts for around 15% 
of Europe’s electrical generation.  While these alternate 
sources of energy can contribute greatly to increased 
diversification of energy supply, the costs for 
implementation are also prohibitive in the short-term.  
Tremendous investment is needed to build and deliver these 
energy sources over many years.  Thus far, this expanding 
market has been incrementally funded and expanded, and while 
goals are seemingly ambitious, they continue to account only 
for small percentages on the periphery.  An example is that 
while the EU has set a 2010 goal to convert petroleum and 
diesel consumption to bio-fuels, it is only intended to 
account for 5.75% of consumption, and 21% of electricity 
should be generated from these renewable sources, but that 
is only a 6% increase from the 2005 usage of 15%.122  While 
these strategies can add diversification to meet Europe’s 
energy needs, natural gas consumption continues to be more 
economical and thus market forces help contribute to 
ensuring Russia will be needed in the future to supply oil 
and natural gas to the European market.   
                     
122 Vince L. Morelli.  “The European Union’s Energy Security 
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IV. RUSSIAN ENERGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From 1991 to 2006, Russia was to the global natural gas 
industry what Saudi Arabia was to oil, controlling over 32 
percent of the world’s proven gas reserves and approximately 
27.5 percent of international gas production.123  Russia’s 
portion of worldwide total proven reserves dwarfed its 
nearest competitors Iran (15 percent), Qatar (7 percent), 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE (4 percent), and the United States 
and Algeria (3 percent), and was nearly ten times the size 
of proven reserves in the Caspian region.124  In spite of 
the fluctuation in domestic gas production, which peaked in 
1991 at approximately 23 tcf (trillion cubic feet), and 
slipped to a low of 20.2 tcf in 1997 before recovering to 
20.6 tcf from 1998-2006 — Russia remained the largest 
exporter of natural gas, controlling as much as 50 percent 
of the world’s gas pipeline exports during the period.125  
The regional structure of the gas sector accentuated 
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Russia’s stature.126  Russia was Europe’s leading gas 
supplier, as it inherited a 25 percent stake in the 
established hard currency markets of Western Europe.  Over 
the course of the decade, Russian deliveries increased to 
cover 42 percent of the European Unions expanding demand.  
In addition, Russia dominated gas export markets in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, initially controlling 
over 80 percent of the supply to both regions.127 
The Russian oil sector was hit hard by the Soviet 
collapse.  After successive years of decline, production 
bottomed out by 1996, contracting roughly 47 percent from 
its peak in 1987 when the Soviet Union led the world in 
national output.  This was primarily due to the virtual 
collapse of investment that curtailed new drilling and the 
industry’s capacity to increase recovery from depleted 
fields.  In contrast to the peak of Soviet production and 
power, when exports accounted for nearly 90 percent of the 
republic’s 5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), an independent 
Russia’s net exports dropped drastically to 3.2 million 
bbl/d from 1993 to 1995.128  Similarly, crude oil transport 
via the Russian pipeline system in 1996 accounted for only 
56 percent of the 1990 throughput.  However, by the end of 
the 1990s, the Russian oil industry seemed to be recovering 
from that decline.  Domestic production and exports both 
increased during the time frame of 1999 to 2003 in response 
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to rising world oil prices, devaluation of the ruble, and 
growing confidence in the investment climate in Russia.129  
Oil companies pumped out 7.59 million bbl/d in 2002--more 
than 25 percent increase over the 1998 level.  This 
positioned Russia as the world’s leading producer in 2002 
for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union.130  
Moreover, by 2006 Russian oil production averaged 9.6 
million bbl/d, and again this amount was only second in the 
world to Saudi Arabia.131  But all of this expansion is not 
without constraints such as pipeline output limitations, 
domestic consumption, poor quality of crude compared to 
growing long-term demand for higher quality of crude from 
competitors, underdeveloped regional oil infrastructure, and 
concerns that consumption growth would outpace the rates of 
reserves replacement.132 
In order to draw conclusions regarding Russia’s 
dependence on European energy demand, three areas will be 
detailed.  First, a statistical analysis of Russian oil and 
gas reserves, production, and exports will be outlined to 
answer the question:  How important are oil and natural gas 
revenues to Russia?  Second, European supply and demand will 
be analyzed with respect of supply sources, consumption, 
long-term contracts, and energy reduction strategies in 
order to determine the extent of the demand of oil and 
natural gas in Europe.  And third, based on the answers to 
both of these questions a Strengths, Weaknesses, 
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Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis will be addressed in 
the conclusion to answer the interrelated question:  What 
are the threats and risks that Russia faces from reduced 
demand in Europe?  Together the answers to these questions 
will explain Russian energy dependence on European demand. 
B. RUSSIAN OIL AND NATURAL GAS EXPORTS 
Russia is important to world energy markets because it 
contains the world’s largest natural gas reserves and the 
eighth largest oil reserves.133  Reserves in coal are 
substantial as well, having the second largest coal 
reserves, but coal is a less used fossil fuel for meeting 
export energy demands and has been used less over the years.  
Therefore oil and natural gas dominate energy export for 
Russia and is the main focus of this thesis.  Figures 10 and 
11 illustrate the vast oil and natural gas resource 
deposits, pipelines, and other energy related infrastructure 
that stretches across Russia.134 
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Figure 10.   Oil Basins and Infrastructure 
 
Figure 11.   Natural Gas Basins and Infrastructure 
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1. Oil and Natural Gas Reserves and Production 
In the oil sector, Russia ranks eighth in the world, 
only behind OPEC countries, with known oil reserves at 60 
billion barrels, as shown in Figure 12, and an additional 
estimate of 67 billion barrels that were technically 
possible to exist but remain unproven.135 
   
Figure 12.   Petroleum Proved Reserves 
Compared to Saudi Arabia, who leads the world in known 
oil reserves at approximately 300 billion barrels, it is 
easy to see that an increase in known barrels for Russia 
would draw them closer to the top power rungs concerning 
oil.  Production and export of oil is of even greater 
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importance for Russia since there are high revenues from 
exports.  Although Russia is eighth in the world in known 
oil reserves, they are second in the world for production 
and export.  Russian oil production in 2006, as shown in 
Figure 13, averaged 9.6 million barrels per day, and again 
this amount is only second in the world to Saudi Arabia.136 
 
Figure 13.   Annual Total Oil Production 
Moving to the natural gas sector, Russia ranks first in 
the world in natural gas reserves, with 1,680 Trillion Cubic 
Feet, which accounts for 27.5% of the world total, and is 
nearly twice as much as the second place country, Iran.137  
When comparing it to other countries that supply natural gas 
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to European countries, Russian reserves dwarf the combined 
totals of Norway, Algeria, and the Netherlands, which is a 
mere 5% of world totals.138  For production, Russia again 
holds the number one position with 21.8% of world totals, 
shown in Figure 14, and followed closely only by the United 
States at 19%, much of which is consumed domestically.139   
 
Figure 14.   Natural Gas Production 
When comparing the world’s natural gas supply, three-
quarters of the reserves lie in Russia, Eurasia, and the 
Middle East.  This is particularly important when you look 
at the export routes to reach Europe, where 100 percent of 
Russian exports are through pipelines — faster, easier, and 
cheaper.  In fact, 100 percent of Russian natural gas 
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exports to all countries are through pipelines.140  To be 
sure, oil and gas are strategic strengths for the Russian 
state and due to geography exporting to Europe is the most 
efficient method to get those resources to the consumers. 
2. Exports to Europe 
Oil and natural gas exports have been a major driver 
for Russia’s economic sustainment for many years, and more 
recently they are one of the most important aspects of the 
economic growth they have seen in the last several years.  
Since this growth is viewed as renewed strength for the 
country, the importance of keeping oil and natural gas 
exports strong has been central to Russian security policy.  
For oil, almost three-fourths of Russian crude oil 
production is exported, or around 6.7 million barrels per 
day.141  Of the oil that was exported, two-thirds went to 
Belarus, Ukraine, Germany, Poland, and other destinations in 
Central and Eastern Europe.142  This is very significant and 
shows a major dependency burden that Russia suffers by 
relying on the European market.  At the same time though, it 
also leads one to believe that exporting to Europe is the 
most economically maximizing way to translate these natural 
resources into state revenue.  For natural gas, Russia has 
historically exported to Eastern Europe and to Former Soviet 
Republics.143  However, of the 7.1 Trillion Cubic Feet (Tcf) 
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exported in 2006, more than 65% went to European states, 
with Germany, Italy, Turkey, France, Hungary, and Finland 
consuming much of it.144  While the natural gas sector has 
other markets to diversify export and revenue reliance as 
compared to the oil industry, such as central and east Asia, 
Russia continues to focus more on the European market based 
on the same demand and efficiencies of the oil industry.  
One extra distinguishing factor for Russia’s added emphasis 
on natural gas exports to Europe is that Europe desires and 
prefers cleaner and cheaper natural gas as opposed to 
oil.145   
3. Revenues 
Revenues from oil and natural gas are significant for 
Russia, and accounted for 37% of the state budget revenues 
in 2005.146  As oil prices continued to grow after 2000, 
Russia saw the profits from the increase of revenues.  These 
profits came at a very important time.  Russia was still 
crawling along after being bankrupt in the late 1990s, and 
the economy was sputtering along.  Oil and gas accounted for 
50% of all export earnings in 2005.147  Additionally, the 
oil export revenues also have been used to pay off Russia’s 
large foreign debt, “around $108 billion as of April 
2005.”148  So, the price of oil and any fluctuations are of 
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considerable importance to Russia since they affect state 
revenues immensely.  Moreover, reductions in revenues from 
oil will also reduce any reinvestment in infrastructure, 
technology, or future growth and efficiency in the industry.  
Conversely, price stability at the high end of historical 
prices lead to progressively easier investments in the 
future which fuel even more economic growth and increases to 
Russia’s GDP. 
As stated earlier, Russia’s GDP has grown steadily over 
the last several years.  The first real jump was in 2000, 
where GDP grew 10%, and although slower, it continued to 
grow at a positive rate, ranging anywhere from 4.3% to 7.3% 
from 2001 through 2005.149  For 2006, the GDP was estimated 
to continue the same strong growth and it came in at 
6.5%.150  Russia’s economic dependence on both oil and gas 
revenues is substantial and unlikely to decrease in the near 
future.  If energy prices fall or even remain flat, Russia’s 
economic growth will slow considerably.  Therefore, as 
stated before, the European market for oil is nearly two-
thirds of Russian oil exports and the European market for 
natural gas is nearly two-thirds of Russia’s export.  Also, 
in 2005, 37% of the Russian state revenue was based on oil 
and natural gas exports, of which, an estimated two-thirds 
came from European consumption.  Hence, nearly one-quarter 
of the Russian state revenue is sourced through oil and 
natural gas exports in response to European energy  
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consumption.  This is a significant portion by any standard 
or measurement and translates into an important Russian 
reliance on European consumption.   
4. Energy Strategy 
While energy strategy takes on many aspects, the major 
focus for Russia has been to systematically use its vast 
natural energy resources as a vital tool of political 
negotiations and economic maturity.  Substantial energy 
resources are central to Russia’s energy policy and they are 
being used to rebuild the state’s power and influence on the 
international level.  Moreover, the dependence of other 
countries on Russian supply of these resources has acted as 
a source of state leverage in political negotiations, 
particularly with Former Soviet Republics.   
In order to fulfill this strategy, state control of 
energy companies and the natural resources that they 
extract, produce, and export is the primary method necessary 
to safeguard this power in order to reemerge with greater 
global influence.  In the 1990s, the government, under 
Yeltsin and early on under Putin, went on a limited campaign 
to attempt privatization and liberalization of many gas and 
energy companies.  Although the plan and execution were 
flawed in some ways, western democracies at least saw this 
attempt at liberal, free-market economy practices as a step 
in the right direction; however, after 2000 the world oil 
prices began to climb, Russia saw significantly increased 
revenues from oil, and by 2003 some company executives like 
Yukos Oil CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, had became millionaires 
seemingly overnight via Russia’s rich natural resources 
previously owned by the state.  The Kremlin realized that 
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oil and natural gas were Russia’s most valuable resource; 
thus, the government moved to gain more control over these 
industries.  Putin’s government banned the planned market 
restructuring of the centralized gas monopoly Gazprom, 
ensured continued state ownership of all pipelines, owned 
all export companies, and enabled the state or state-owned 
companies to acquire other energy companies such as Sibneft 
and Yukos.151  Additionally, the Sakhalin-II project, which 
promised a significant long-term increase in exports and 
revenue to and from the Asian markets, was renegotiated, 
since previous contracts were made in 1994 and no longer 
fair according to Putin’s government.  The foreign companies 
owning rights to Sakhalin II, such as Royal Dutch Shell, 
Mitsui & Co, and Mitsubishi were forced to sell some shares 
of the project to Gazprom in order for Gazprom to control 
51% of the consortium or they would be forced to pay 
inexorably high environmental fines.152  The tightening of 
government control over the production, transport, and 
export of energy in many ways is a clear indication of the 
importance that Russia places on this industry as a 
strategic national interest.  
 
                     
151 Martha Brill Olcott, “The Energy Dimension in Russian Global 
Strategy: Vladimir Putin and The Geopolitics of Oil,” The James A. Baker 
III Institute for Public Policy, of Rice University, October 2004.  
152 Lionel Beehner, “Russia’s Energy Disputes,” Council on Foreign 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. STRATEGIC CULTURE AND PAST ACTIONS 
It is clear that there are certain elements of Russian 
strategic culture that have remained intact over history as 
Colin Gray would argue should be the case since strategic 
culture changes only slowly over time.153  Soviet strategic 
culture is a fitting example to use when attempting to 
explain and compare the continuity of Putin’s policies and 
the reasons are simple.  First, the Soviet Union is one of 
the most studied and documented political structures because 
it existed very recently and lasted a long time . Also it 
was studied in great detail since the stakes were high, the 
danger was real, and the consequences of not understanding 
Soviet thought may have led to nuclear war, dismantling of 
western capitalism, and even destruction of western 
countries.   
Domestically, Putin has halted some of the progress 
made towards a more democratic Russia.  The primary method 
has been to consolidate central state power that was lost 
after the fall of the Soviet Union and to regain ground in 
some of the same areas the Soviets dominated.  The examples 
in Chapter II concentrate on the more apparent cases that 
are considered negative for Russian chances of democratic 
development and include the increase of the executive 
branch’s power, state takeover of a business on the grounds 
of national security interests, and the control of major 
                     
153 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context:  The First 
Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25 
(1999): 52. 
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national media outlets.  But it is also important to point 
out that this was not achieved solely by Putin and his inner 
circle, rather there was consent from like minded people 
both in society at large as well as the elites.  And since 
consent was present, the Kremlin is less constrained in its 
choices to move toward more authoritarian domestic policy 
and strategy.  The same can be said of the more 
confrontational foreign policy strategy which resembles 
realpolitik as Putin repeatedly mentions the return to a 
multi-polar world.  Russia’s renewed vigor to oppose the 
West is “driven by a blend of national resentment and 
ambition … in pursuit of those valuable if intangible 
national interests:  Honor and respect.”154  Therefore, the 
ability to exert Russian influence in a confrontational 
manner at the international level, bolstered by these same 
societal and nationalist appeals to return to Russian 
greatness will likely ensure Russia’s continuation of the 
current foreign policy approach.  But this is not to say 
that every issue for Russia will become a cause for a 
confrontation.  Rather, Russia will employ a calculated 
approach that weighs all aspects of the situation at hand to 
ensure that if they must confront the political or economic 
policies of another country, then their cause will be viewed 
legitimate to themselves first.  This means that some 
variable of circumstances surrounding a particular issue 
must have changed from the past so the status quo is no 
longer acceptable based on the new situation.  A second 
factor will be that the interests are of national 
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importance; and third, that the position will be supported 
domestically.  Thus, the threat that Russia will deny energy 
resources that are needed by European countries is real.  
But the likelihood or probability that Russia would act in 
such a way is more difficult to determine.  Strategic 
culture and past actions do not mean that it is bound to 
happen, only that it could occur.  The current calculus and 
balance of power and interest in the situation must further 
be analyzed to illuminate a better understanding.   
B. EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE 
European dependence on energy in the near and distant 
future will continue.  The impacts of energy dependence are 
of vital importance and affect the region strategically.  
While energy dependence is seen as a negative factor in 
leveraging political negotiations, there is no apparent 
quick fix to this predicament.  A majority of European 
countries rely heavily on oil and natural gas from Russia 
and this is not likely to change in any drastic way due to 
the high efficiency and low transaction costs of receiving 
these resources through direct and indirect pipelines.  
While some European oil and natural gas import sources are 
diversified, they are insignificant compared to what Russia 
can deliver now and into the foreseeable future.  Europe 
will depend on Russia for oil and natural gas for as long as 
these fossil fuels are burned as the primary energy source.   
Alternative fuels, while their market share is growing, 
also do not offer a realistic solution any time soon.  While 
nuclear, hydro, wind, and other sources of energy offer the 
possibility to change the core of European energy sources, 
the cost remains prohibitive.  The transition from oil and 
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natural gas to these other sources will take time and 
tremendous expense in order to allow economic stability.  
Infrastructure, corporations, and workers all require a 
systematic change in converting to these new energy sources 
and in order to do that, time is the key element.  Europeans 
seem to know and understand this and instead of confronting 
Russia are employing cooperation as the key to building a 
long-term relationship with Russia as a dependable supplier. 
C. RUSSIAN ENERGY ASSESSMENT  
Russia has emerged over the last several years as a 
world energy powerhouse.155  The two main pillars of energy 
that contribute most to this power are oil and natural gas.  
As with most cases concerning the power that one country 
has, other countries will naturally perceive it as a threat.  
This is the case with Russian energy.  Specifically, 
European countries that depend on Russian oil and natural 
gas imports fear over-reliance from Russian energy sources 
as a threat and risk to their security.  However, when 
viewed from the Russian perspective, Russia may also feel 
that they are overly dependent on Europe as a consumer of 
their oil and natural gas.  Russia relies heavily on energy 
exports for state revenues and the European market is a 
vital part of those revenues.   
Energy is the source of new found power for Russia and 
has helped to turn around their fortune in recent years, 
especially since world oil prices have grown to well over 
$90 per barrel and tripling the $30 average in the 1990s.  
                     
155 The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies.  “Energy Security Series:  
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Since the lowest times of Russian bankruptcy in 1998, the 
revenues from oil and natural gas exports have seemingly 
been the most important tool for Russia to enable them to 
turn around their debt burden.  Since 1999, Russia’s Gross 
National Product (GNP) growth has averaged between 6 and 7%, 
and estimates point to maintaining these numbers over the 
next several years.156  Indeed, Russian energy resources 
coupled with high prices and greedy European demand has 
lifted their economic outlook for the future.  Historically, 
Russia has always wanted to be known as a secure energy 
provider, and over the past several years Europe’s market 
has steadily relied more and more on Russian oil and gas.  
But recent events have tarnished Russia’s reputation as a 
reliable energy source and caused European countries to more 
aggressively explore alternative methods and strategies to 
fuel their countries and economies.157  If Russia is too 
dependent on Europe’s consumption and the revenues that are 
created, then the new found prosperity and political 
strength could end and result in serious threats to other 
national interests. 
In order for Russia to continue to realize continued 
success in the energy sector, albeit, relative to their past 
economic and political turmoil since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, a close view of its current strengths 
and weaknesses should be made here.  Additionally,  
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opportunities and threats should also be listed, as they 
pertain to Russian dependence on Europe and their relations 
to other parts of the world.   
Russia has benefited from increased energy prices by 
strengthening its economy and its geopolitical position.  
Russia’s GNP has continued to grow over the last several 
years and the living standards of Russia in general has 
increased along with that.  Instead of a deficit, Russia now 
runs a modest surplus in the state budget, and demonstrates 
financially responsible habits such as repaying foreign 
debts ahead of schedule, accumulating the world’s third-
largest currency reserves, and has built a $50 billion 
stabilization fund.158  Moreover, they have definitely 
reappeared as a stronger political actor on the world stage 
as demonstrated in recent involvement with the G-8, United 
Nations, World Trade Organizations and other international 
forums.  Much of this reemergence can be cautiously 
attributed to the energy industry and the strengths of that 
industry.  But the energy system that has been built 
operates in a volatile world and contains weaknesses that 
should be improved.  Resulting from these strengths and 
weaknesses are opportunities and threats which are discussed 
here. 
1. Strengths 
Oil and Natural Gas Reserves are plentiful and should 
continue to keep Russian revenues high.  Plans to expand and 
build new pipelines include increasing the capacity from 
Belarus to Poland in the Druzhba Oil pipeline that runs from 
                     
158 Lionel Beehner, “Russia’s Energy Disputes.” 
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southern Russia, near Kazakhstan to Germany.  Along the way 
it collects oil from the Urals and Caspian Sea and feeds 
Ukraine, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Hungary.159  The 
Baltic Pipeline system carries crude oil from Russia’s West 
Siberian and Tyumen-Pechora oil provinces to Primorsk.  The 
plan here is to increase output from 1 million barrels per 
day (bbl/d), to 1.2 million bbl/d.  Plans also include 
converting the Adria pipeline from import to export, leading 
to an increase of another 300,000 bbl/d.  Other oil pipeline 
proposals seek to export oil from East Siberia to the ever 
growing Chinese market, and are coupled with both oil and 
natural gas in the Sakhalin II project.  In Europe, the Blue 
Stream pipeline services Turkey.  The Yamal-Europe I 
pipeline, that runs through Belarus, Poland, and Germany may 
be doubled — the Yamal II — then split either in Belarus or 
Poland to travel south to provide more gas to Slovakia, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria, and Italy.160  And as 
discussed earlier, the Nord Stream will link Russia directly 
with Germany for increased supply of natural gas as well.  
Other strengths include that there is a pre-existing and 
extensive domestic infrastructure, they have in fact a 
strong export market position, a large domestic market, and 
are a gateway for a significant portion of Central Asian 
exports.  
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2. Weaknesses 
Although previously Russia has tried to maintain a 
constant supply of oil and natural gas to consumer 
countries, the recent events in Ukraine and Belarus have 
tarnished their reputation as a reliable energy provider and 
could slow future demand from European countries.  Lack of 
competition and monopolistic practices do not provide 
incentives to increase production efficiency, reinvest in 
technology, or increase production.  The existing natural 
gas fields are in decline and infrastructure is 
deteriorating.  Subsequently, absence of competition does 
not provide the adequate incentive to reinvest these areas.  
Government majority control of energy companies limits 
access to external financing.  A majority of exports rely on 
multi-country transit routes, which keep cost higher due to 
transaction costs such as tariffs and taxes.  Russia is 
working to eliminate some of these weaknesses, for example, 
by building the Nord Stream pipeline that does not transit 
through other countries, but monopolistic structure of the 
energy companies will ensure that some of these weaknesses 
continue and could lead to greater problems in the future.  
While pipelines reach many different markets, production 
capacity is fully utilized — a limitation to increase 
exports which also prevents surge exportation.  Finally, 
Russia’s inefficient domestic consumption takes away some of 




Several opportunities present themselves based on the 
strengths of Russia’s energy environment.  Increasing 
exports to Europe is an obvious one, but they should proceed 
with caution pertaining to long-term contracts and continue 
to ensure that diversification diffuses over-reliance.  
Russia should continue to expand at a more rapid rate in the 
export market to the east.  Energy markets in China, 
Southeast Asia, and Africa will continue to grow and this 
presents a perfect opportunity for export diversification.  
One example that shows Russia is taking advantage of this 
opportunity is that Russia Petroleum, a consortium of TNK-
BP, has plans to construct a pipeline connecting Kovykta 
natural gas field to China along the Yellow Sea to South 
Korea.  The pipeline is slated to have a capacity of over 40 
billion cubic meters per year and deliver nearly half of its 
natural gas to China and the rest to South Korea, with 
revenues running up to $1.2 - 1.4 billion per year by 
2020.161  Russia should invest in energy efficiency within 
its own borders also.  Implementing initiatives to increase 
domestic reliance on nuclear, wind, and hydropower for 
energy generation may free up oil and natural gas for 
export.   
4. Threats 
Europe is taking steps to ensure that they also 
diversify their supply of energy resources, particularly oil 
and natural gas.  A major threat to Russia is a loss of the 
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European market share not only to reduced consumption by 
Europe thanks to alternative energy sources mentioned before 
and including nuclear, water, and hydro; but also thanks to 
Europe finding alternative countries as sources of oil and 
natural gas.  While this threat is seemingly less pronounced 
since Russia has a geographical and infrastructure 
advantage, countries on the north of Africa could enter the 
market by offering resources at lower prices if they improve 
efficiency at a faster rate than Russia.   
The current pipelines that run from northern Africa, 
across the Mediterranean, to Europe have not yet realized 
their full potential.  Free market economy and competitive 
forces could propel these areas as a more economical and 
diverse choice for Europe.  Other threats include disruption 
of exports, whether it occurs by accident, environmental 
constraints, or possible internal and external terrorist 
attacks.  An additional threat includes Russia’s inability 
to meet future domestic demands, especially if domestic 
energy efficiency does not improve or increase at a 
significant rate.  But perhaps the most ominous threat is 
financial insolvency —especially if oil and natural gas 
prices decline.  While many other aspects of the threats 
involved can be held at bay through some control measures or 
policies, the decline in prices involves factors through the 
entire international economic community and worldwide 
demand.  Historically there are price fluctuation and peaks 
and valleys in energy prices due to changes in technology, 
supply, and demand.  This threat could affect the Russian 
economic outlook in such a negative manner that it 
definitely requires an insulation plan to keep the impact as 
 87
low as possible — and diversification to European and other 
markets could be key to that plan.  
D. THE CURRENT CALCULUS 
Russia depends on its wealth of oil and natural gas 
reserves as export income tremendously.  It accounts for a 
large portion of total state revenues and has been a 
positive source of domestic growth as measured through 
annual increase in Gross Domestic Product.  The European 
market is a significant percentage of the total revenues 
received through energy exports and illustrates the 
dependence Russia has on this market.  The continued high 
level of state revenues for Russia depends on two very 
important factors — demand stability in the European energy 
consumption market, and growth in other markets, such as 
China and other Asian countries.  Due to Russia’s 
overdependence on the European market, it can be concluded 
that they should implement changes affecting these two 
areas.   
First, Russia needs to ensure that they remain viable 
as energy exporters in Europe.  This includes being able to 
meet the consumption demands of Europe through increased 
domestic efficiency and decreased domestic consumption, 
thereby freeing energy export resources for Europe, and 
increasing capacity of transit routes to ensure that demand 
can be met.  Additionally, Russia needs to reinvest in 
infrastructure and technology to maintain efficiency and 
keep cost competitive.  Finally, Russia needs to rebuild 
their reputation as a reliable energy provider.  All of 
these factors are critical in order to keep Europe as a 
favored customer.  If Russia implements these policies, 
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Europe will have little alternative than to seek the path 
dictated by market forces and continue to embrace Russian 
energy imports versus seeking alternative energy sources.   
Second, Russia needs to diversify their export regions.  
While maintaining European demand is important, a larger 
percentage of exports and revenues resulting from those 
exports need to come from different areas.  Exports to 
China, South Korea, and Japan are a step in this direction.  
A major obstacle that slows this process is the absence of 
capital.  Due to state control over production, transit, and 
export companies such as Gazprom, international companies 
and investors are more hesitant to offer the necessary 
capital needed to create new markets.  A lack of investment 
funds now will stunt future growth and allow for competitor 
countries to gain market shares in exporting to these 
emerging markets.  Together, by first ensuring Europe turns 
to Russia as its prime energy provider coupled with 
diversifying their export markets, Russian over dependence 
on Europe will slowly equalize to a more balanced, stable 
relationship. 
The threat that Russia will use energy as a 
manipulation tool is real and should not be taken lightly.  
European officials are correct in ensuring that they create 
an energy strategy that keeps the influence and balance of 
power of this delicate consumer/supplier relationship in 
harmony.  The actual risk, probability, or likelihood — 
versus the mere threat — that Russia will use denial of 
energy resources as a political tool is more complex, as are 
the variety of situations where its use would be beneficial 
for Russia.  Based on the intricate details of the 
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interdependence of Europe to fuel their economies and 
Russia’s need to supply these resources in exchange for 
revenues, fear and uncertainty will continue.  If Russia 
denied energy resources, they would only temporarily lose a 
portion of state revenue and perception as a reliable energy 
supplier.  If they denied energy in large scale issue, then 
they would lose state revenue and illicit a harsh and more 
costly reaction from the West, such as trade sanctions.  
Therefore, Russia is more likely to deny energy resources in 
small scale issues that are less costly in the long run.  
Europe has much more to lose if energy supplies were 
interrupted as the effects would send shockwaves throughout 
the economy of any country on the receiving end.  The higher 
costs to Europe compared to Russia will increase if Russia 
continues to diversify their customer base in Asia as well 
as other countries.  Some similarities, although limited, 
can be made by comparing the use of energy as a political 
weapon to that of nuclear weapons.  The fear of the other 
side actually using such a weapon can have a destabilizing 
effect just as the anticipated results, which would be 
catastrophic.  Fortunately, the decision to use the energy 
tool can be reversed relatively quickly and without the same 
permanent fall out.  Based on this, it should be expected 
that Russia will benefit more by merely offering the threat 
as perceived by Europeans, rather than actually employing it 
on a scale that would cost huge amounts of political 
capital.   
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